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A LOGICAL LOOK AT SPECIAL ISSUE 
CONFLICTS 
by: Kevin W. Saunders* 
In the United States, there are four methods for submitting a 
case to a jury: (1) the general charge, (2) submission of factual issues 
for a special verdict, (3) the general charge with interrogatories on 
some issues, and (4) submission of the whole case as a series of 
interrogatories. l The last of these four methods, known as "special 
issue submission,"2 has a long history in Texas civil procedure. 3 The 
basis for such submission is found in the former Rule 277 of the 
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule stated: 
In all jury cases the court may submit said cause upon special 
issues without request of either party, and, upon request of either 
party, shall submit the cause upon special issues controlling the 
disposition of the case that are raised by the written pleadings 
and the evidence in the case, except that for good cause subject 
to review or on agreement of the parties, the court may submit 
the same on a general charge.4 
While it is "discretionary with the court whether to submit separate 
questions with respect to each element of the case or to submit the 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. A.B., Franklin and Marshall 
College; M.S., M.A., Ph.D., University of Miami; J.D., University of Michigan. 
I. Dooley, The Use of Special Issues Under the New State and Federal Rules, 20 TEX. 
L. REV. 32, 32 (1941) [hereinafter Dooley]. 
2. In distinguishing special verdicts and special issue submission, Dooley notes that" [i]n 
the early Texas procedure the special verdict commonly was in the form of a narrative finding 
of facts, unlike the question and answer technique of our present special issue procedure and 
more similar in form to findings of fact made by the court in a non-jury case." Dooley, supra 
note 1, at 32. 
3. See Note, The Scope of Special Issues in Negligence Cases: Pleadings, Proof, and 
Rule 277, 15 HOUSTON L. REV. 735, 736-37 (1978) [hereinafter Note, The Scope of Special 
Issues] ("the practice of submission in a question and answer format similar to contemporary 
special issue practice was recognized at least as early as 1876"). For a partial history of special 
issue submission leading to alleged conflicts, see infra, note 12 and accompanying text. 
4. Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 (Vernon Supp. 1986). While this article was in press, Rule 277 
was amended to provide that "[i]n all jury cases the court shall, whenever feasible, submit 
the cause upon broad-form questions. The court shall submit such instructions and definitions 
as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a verdict." 50 TEX. B. J. 865 (1987). The 
inclusion of the phrase "whenever feasible" certainly still allows for the submission of special 
issues, and it is not at all clear that the amendment will cut significantly into the practice. 
37 
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issues broadly,"S and while even a negligence question might now be 
submitted as a global issue,6 there are still arguments to be made for 
special issue submission,? and cases continue to be submitted in that 
form.8 
The history of special issue submission has been accompanied 
by a long history of problems resulting from that form of submission. 
In a 1942 article, J.B. Dooley, a member of the Texas Supreme 
Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Procedure, cataloged four 
chief complaints: (1) the progressive multiplication of issues, (2) 
conflicts between jury findings, (3) problems of omitted issues, and 
(4) difficulties drawing lines between general charges and special 
issues. 9 By 1953, a former President of the Texas Bar, in re-examining 
Dooley's four complaints, was able to conclude that "[wJhile we 
have by no means eliminated all of these objections, it is quite 
evident that we have made considerable progress. "10 With regard to 
the one complaint to be addressed in this article, it was said: "Since 
our trial judges are now privileged to retire a jury for further 
deliberations, upon perceiving that conflicting answers may have been 
made, we are not too much plagued by this. The court may now 
call the attention of the jury to the conflict and retire them for 
further deliberations." II Despite this assurance, the line of cases in 
which an appellate court has been called upon to resolve a dispute 
over the existence and effect of a conflict between responses to 
special issues has continued from before 1942, through the 1953 claim 
of having the problem in hand, through the 1973 amendments,12 and 
continues into the current decade. 
5. Id. 
6. See Spradley, The Global Issue: Outlaw of the Special Issue Practice, 18 HOUSTON L. 
REv. I, 1-5 (1980) [hereinafter Spradley) (discussing the effect of the 1973 amendments to 
Rule 277). 
7. See id. at 14-40 (arguing against the submission of global issues). 
8. See infra note 12 for older, as well as more recent, cases in which special issues were 
submitted and a question of conflict arose. 
9. See Dooley, supra note I, at 34-35 (also noting that "new" rules, effective in 1941, 
took measures to remedy the problems). 
10. Jones, Special Issue Submission, 16 TEX. B.J. 285, 285 (1953) [hereinafter Jones). 
II. Id. at 340. 
12. See, e.g., Huber v. Ryan, 627 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1981); Producers Chern. Co. v. 
McKay, 366 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. 1963); Traywick v. Goodrich, 364 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. 1963); 
Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Craik, 162 Tex. 260, 346 S.W.2d 830 (1961); Bradford v. Arhelger, 161 
Tex. 427, 340 S.W.2d 772 (1960); Texas & P. R.R. Co. v. Snider, 159 Tex. 380, 321 S.W.2d 
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This article will address the problem of conflicts between or 
among responses to special issue submissionsY Section I will dem-
onstrate the inadequacy of standard propositional logic in identifying 
and examining contradictions between or among findings of fact. 14 
Section II will present a logic that does not face the inadequacies of 
propositional logic with regard to fact finding. IS Section III will 
discuss, in theoretical terms, the application of the logic presented 
in Section II; 16 and in Sections IV and V the logic will be applied to 
the reasoning of several appellate cases examining conflicting find-
ings. l ? 
Even if practitioners and courts do not use the formal methods 
discussed, an understanding of the discussion should lead to better 
informal examination of potential conflicts. Furthermore, an under-
standing of the logical relationships between findings of fact might 
help alleviate the problems presented by the multiplication of special 
issues l8 and the failure to submit necessary issues. 19 
I. THE INADEQUACY OF PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC 
One difficulty in determining whether jury findings in response 
to the submission of special issues conflict may weII be the inadequacy 
of standard logic in analyzing the possible conflict. Similarly, that 
logical inadequacy may be at the root of the inartful drafting of 
special issues that leads to seemingly conflicting findings.20 
280 (1959); Meacham v. Loving, 155 Tex. 279, 285 S.W.2d 936 (1956); Little Rock Furniture 
Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197,222 S.W.2d 985 (1949); A.B.C. Stores, Inc. v. Taylor, 136 
Tex. 89, 148 S.W.2d 392 (1941); Lewis v. Yaggi, 584 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Norris v. Branham, 557 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, 
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rhoades v. Castillo, 488 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ 
ref'd n.r.e.); Billingsley v. Southern Pac. Co., 400 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, 
writ ref'd n.r.e.). 
13. While not all of the cases presented in note 12 will be analyzed, the methods presented 
could be applied to the remaining cases. 
14. See infra notes 20-34 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 35-89 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 109-87 and accompanying text. 
18. See supra text accompanying note 9. A failure to understand how special issues 
interrelate may lead, through an abundance of caution, to the submission of unnecessary 
issues. This, of course, has the further effect of increasing the likelihood of some of the issues 
conflicting. . 
19. [d. A failure to appreciate the logical relationships between various elements of the 
cause of action might be a factor in the failure to submit a necessary issue. 
20. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
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The inadequacy of propositional logic is explained by the prob-
abilistic nature of fact findings. The jury, in finding a fact, is 
asserting that the fact in question has been established with a certain 
degree of probabilitY,21 the degree of probability required being 
determined by the nature of the proceeding.22 If multiple findings of 
fact are to be analyzed together, or inferences are to be drawn from 
findings of fact, the logic in which the analysis is performed, or in 
which the inferences are drawn, must take into account the proba-
bilistic nature of the propositions involved. As the examples that 
follow show,23 propositional logic fails to appreciate the difficulties 
inherent in working with probability based propositions. 
For example, consider the case in which a jury is willing to find 
as fact some proposition p and also find as fact a proposition q. If 
findings of fact are identified with the true propositions on which 
logic operates, then a problem arises. From the truth of p and the 
truth of q, the truth of p and q may be inferred in propositional 
logic, therefore, it could be concluded that the jury would have to 
be willing to find as fact the proposition p and q. 
Consider, however, the following fact setting. An exhibition 
takes place for which 400 persons have paid admission, but 1,000 
are counted in the seating area. No tickets were issued, so there is 
no way to distinguish gate crashers from those who have paid. If a 
person is chosen at random from those in attendance, the probability 
is 0.6 that the person is a trespasser.24 
Suppose also, that after the exhibition ends and the crowd heads 
for the exit, a quick check of the stands shows that sixty percent of 
the chairs have been damaged solely as a result of having been used 
as seats. The defendant was identified as having been in attendance 
aJ?d suit is brought for damage to a chair. 
21. For a discussion of the various concepts of probability and their application to legal 
analysis, see L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977) [hereinafter COHENJ. 
22. If numerical values are to be attached to the levels of probability necessary for a 
finding, anything in excess of 0.5 would appear to correspond to the normal civil suit standard 
of "more probable than not" or "by a preponderance". No such neat assignment jumps to 
the forefront for proof by "clear and convincing evidence" or proof "beyond a reasonable 
doubt". Whatever value is chosen below the complete certainty represented by a probability 
of 1.0, the problems raised by the examples will, with some change of figures, remain problems. 
23. For further discussion of the problems involved in the marriage of probability and 
judicial reasoning, see COHEN, supra note 21, at 49-120. 
24. This is the "gatecrasher" problem presented by COHEN, supra note 21, at 74-76. 
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The issues in dispute are trespass and damage. On purely prob-
abilistic grounds, the jury should find it more probable than not that 
defendant was a trespasser, and the jury should also find it more 
probable than not that the chair defendant used was damaged. 25 
However, even having found each of the conjuncts, the jury would 
not be justified in finding that Defendant was a trespasser and he 
damaged a chair. Assuming there is no correlation between trespass 
and damage to one of the chairs, that is, that the events are 
independent, the probability of the defendant being in both groups, 
trespassers and chair damagers, is the product of the probability of 
being a trespasser, 0.6, and the probability of being a chair damager, 
also 0.6. The probability of defendant's liability is then 0.36,26 and 
the jury is not, on probabilistic grounds, justified in finding the 
conjunction. 
A similar, but more complex problem is presented by a situation 
in which the jury has found as fact p or q and has also found as 
fact not-q.27 If the two findings are taken as true propositions in 
25. Cohen presents the gatecrasher problem to show the difficulty in analyzing legal 
probability from a mathematician's point of view. It does indeed seem odd that the legal 
system might find liability based on purely statistical evidence of this sort, see also Brilmayer 
& Hornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 116 
(1978); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. 
REv. 1329 (1971), but see Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. 
Cw. L. REv. 34 (1979), especially in light of the fact that the same analysis might be used to 
prove, in independent trials, that each person in attendance was liable, whereas forty percent 
are in fact not liable because they did not trespass, and perhaps as many as two-thirds of the 
trespassers are not liable because they did not damage their chairs, so that eighty percent of 
those in attendance would not in fact be liable, but each could be found liable. 
The mathematician's view was employed here, despite Cohen's finding of fault, because it 
more clearly presents the problem raised by conjoining findings of fact and claiming that the 
conjunct has been found. Whatever approach to probability is used, the probability of a 
conjunction will be less than the probability of either conjunct, and finding each conjunct will 
not entail a finding of the conjunction. 
26. Where two events are independent, that is, the occurrence of one having no effect on 
the probability of the occurrence of the other, the probability of both happening is the product 
of the probabilities of the individual events. Where events are not independent, the probability 
of (A and B) occurring is the probability of A multiplied by the probability of (B given that 
A has occurred). Unless B always occurs when A occurs, the probability of (B given that A 
has occurred) will be less than one, and the probability of the conjunction will be less than 
either conjunct. While the figures found in the example in the text would have to be adjusted, 
the same problems would arise. 
27. It should be noted that there is a difference between a finding of not-q and a failure 
to find q. The difference is not important to this example, but it will be discussed infra at 
notes 149-51 and accompanying text. 
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propositional logic, the truth of p may be inferred, so the jury would 
be taken to have implicitly found p. However, as the following 
example shows, when the probabilistic nature of the findings is taken 
into account, the inference is invalid. 
Suppose that three persons each drive identical golf balls in the 
direction of the parking lot at a public park and that it is negligent 
to do so. Having seen the balls veer or hook into the lot, none of 
the golfers goes to retrieve his ball. Later, two of the balls are found 
lying in empty parking stalls,apparently having done no damage. The 
third is found on the front seat of a locked automobile, the windshield 
of which is smashed. A, B, and C are identified as the persons who 
drove the golf balls, and the owner of the automobile files suit 
against A. Negligence is admitted, and the only issue is causation. 
Let p, q, and r represent the propositions A's golf ball broke 
the windshield, B's golf ball broke the windshield, and C's golf ball 
broke the windshield, respectively. If A, B, and C are all equally 
likely to have driven the ball that did the damage, and it is accepted 
that no one else was involved, then the probability that each was the 
one who drove the errant ball is one-third. The probability that (A's 
golf ball broke the windshield or B's golf ball broke the windshield) 
would then be two-thirds,2s and a jury would be justified on prob-
abilistic grounds in finding p or q.29 Furthermore, the probability 
that B's golf ball did not break the windshield, Le., the probability 
of not-q, is two-thirds,30 so that the jury would be justified, on 
probabilistic grounds, in finding not-q. 31 However, the jury would 
not be justified in finding p, since the probability of p is only one-
third. In fact, the jury would be justified, on probabilistic grounds,32 
in finding not-p, as well as not-r.33 
28. The probability of (p or q) is the probability of p plus the probability of q minus 
the probability of (p and q); that is: 
Probability (p or q) = Probability p + Probability q - Probability (p and q). 
Where p and q cannot both occur, the probability of (p and q) is zero, and the probability 
of (p or q) equals the probability of p plus the probability of q, here, one-third plus one-
third or two-thirds. 
29. Again, one may question the wisdom of establishing liability on purely statistical 
grounds, see supra note 25, but whatever concept of probability is employed, the example in 
the text will present a problem. 
30. The probability of not-q is one minus the probability of q, here, one minus one-third 
or two-thirds. 
31. But see supra notes 25 & 29. 
32. But see supra notes 25 & 29. 
33. Burden of proof assignment and the requirement of a positive showing to establish 
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Clearly, findings of fact may not be treated as the true propo-
sitions of propositional logic. However, the conclusion of this section 
should not be that propositional logic must be totally abandoned in 
analyzing fact-finding, merely that it must be extended. Propositional 
logic does have application, but one must be careful in applying its 
rules. If a jury has found p and has found q, then it is legitimate 
to say "p is found and q is found." Illegitimacy results only when 
one attempts to conclude that p and q is found. 
The difference might be clarified by employing symbols. Let Fp 
represent 'p' is found or 'p' must be taken as found; and let Fq 
represent 'q' is found or 'q' must be taken as found; and let F(p and 
q) represent 'p and q' is found or 'p and q' must be taken as found, 
etc. Further, in place of and substitute &. The difference may then 
be stated that from Fp and Fq it is permissible to infer Fp & Fq, 
but it is not permissible to infer F(p & q). 
Similarly, in the second example, if it was known that the jury 
had found p or had found q, and it was known that the jury had 
not found q, it would be proper to conclude that the jury had found 
p. In symbols, using V to represent or, from Fp V Fq and not-Fq 
it is permissible to infer Fp. The mistake in the example was an 
attempt to infer Fp from F(p V q) and F(not-q). 
Propositional logic may be used to build up or break down 
complex statements that combine individual findings. That is, from 
Fp & Fq, one may infer Fp, and from Fq one may infer Fp V Fq. 
However, it is not proper to use propositional logic-like rules to 
build up or break down complex findings from or to individual 
findings; for example, to infer F(p & q) from Fp and Fq or to infer 
Fq from F(p V q) and F(not-p). Yet it is the ability to combine and 
dismantle findings and obtain other findings that is necessary for an 
adequate analysis of fact findings. The next section provides an 
extension of propositional logic34 providing this ability and the ca-
pacity to analyze fact finding. 
liability make this result reasonable in a way that the gatecrasher result of finding everyone 
present to be a gatecrasher, see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text, is not. 
34. An extension of a logic is a system in which everything that was provable in the first 
logic remains provable and in which additional theorems may also be proved. See, e.g., A. 
HAMILTON, LOGIC FOR MATHEMATICIANS 38 (1978) ("[a]n extension of L is a formal system 
obtained by altering or enlarging the set of axioms so that all theorems of L remain theorems 
(and new theorems are possibly introduced). ") (emphasis in original). 
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II. A LOGIC OF FINDINGS 
The examples from the last section, showing the inadequacy of 
propositional logic in analyzing findings of fact,35 also provide some 
insight into what is necessary for a logic to be adequate. A finding 
of p and q could not be inferred from findings of p and of q, 
because the probability of the conjunction was less than or equal to 
the probability of each conjunct.36 If the probability was less than 
either conjunct,37 then the probability of the conjunction might have 
fallen below the level required for a finding. Nonetheless, if the 
probability of a proposition is above the level required for a finding, 
there may be other propositions of sufficiently high probability that 
they could be conjoined with the finding, and the conjunction would 
be of sufficient probability to be taken as a finding. 38 The difficulty 
in applying this fact to findings is that the precise probability of the 
finding is unknown,39 and, therefore, it is also unknown how high 
the probability of the proposition to be conjoined must be. 
The only propositions that may be known to be of sufficiently 
high probability are those that express certainties,40 that is, those that 
are necessarily true. If a proposition is necessarily true, its probability 
may be taken as equal to one.41 When such a proposition is conjoined 
with a finding of fact, the probability of the conjunct is. equal to 
35. See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text. 
36. See supra note 26. 
37. The probability of the conjunction will be less than either conjunct, unless the 
probability of one of the conjuncts is equal to one. 
38. If proof is by a preponderance, and the probability of p is x, then the probability of 
q need only exceed 0.5 divided by x for the probability of (p&q) to exceed 0.5 and for (p&q) 
to then be taken as found. 
39. Knowing that p is found merely assures that its probability has been found to exceed 
some value, for example, one-half in the case of proof by a preponderance, but does not 
indicate by how much the minimal value is exceeded. 
40. If one is to be assured that a proposition p may be conjoined with a finding q and 
that the conjunction will have sufficient probability to be taken as a finding, it must be 
assumed that q has the minimal probability required for a finding. As the probability of q is 
taken to have values closer and closer to, but greater than 0.5, the probability of p must 
become closer and closer to 0.5 divided by that value. See supra note 38. That is, the 
probability of p must be closer and closer to one. 
41. If probability is viewed as expressing relative frequency, then where p is necessarily 
true, it must occur on every repetition, and the probability of p will be one. Similarly, if 
probability is viewed as expressing a degree of belief, and if the values assigned to the degree 
of belief remain between zero and one inclusive, those that are necessary must be assigned the 
highest degree of belief and thus must be assigned the probability of one. 
HeinOnline -- 19 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 45 1988
1988] SPECIAL ISSUE CONFLICTS 45 
the probability of the conjoined finding, and the conjunction may 
be taken as found. 42 Similarly, if p or q is found as fact, and not-q 
is necessary, then the probability of q made no contribution toward 
increasing the probability of p or q. The probability of p or q is 
equal to the probability of p, and p may be taken as found. 43 
The need to employ necessary truth in analyzing findings of fact 
leads in the direction of developing a system of modal 10gic.44 Such 
a system will be presented in this section,45 but first, more must be 
said about what is to be considered a necessary truth. 
Th-ere are at least three ways in which to view necessary truth. 
The logician, D. Paul Snyder, discusses logical necessity, conceptual 
necessity, and theoretical necessity. 46 A proposition is logically nec-
essary if and only if it is mandated by the laws of logic. 47 If the 
necessity to be employed in analyzing findings of fact were to be 
taken as logical necessity, the logic would be lacking in analytic 
power, and little of interest would result. Only tautologies could be 
combined with findings of fact. Even definitions of legal terms such 
as "trespass" and "negligence" could not be combined with findings 
to produce other findings, since in such definitions the definiens and 
definiendum are not tautologically equivalent. 
Snyder's conceptual necessity is more promising in that it at 
least allows for legal definitions to function as necessary propositions. 
Conceptual necessity arises from the way in which terms are used in 
a language or linguistic context. 48 For example, in law, the term 
"trespass" is limited to situations in which the property in question 
42_ In such a case, the probability of p&q equals the probability of p multiplied by one. 
See supra note 26_ Since the probability of p&q equals the probability of p, if p is found, so 
is p&q. 
43_ The probability of pVq equals the probability of p plus the probability of q minus 
the probability of p&q. If not-q is necessary, then q is impossible. See infra note 75 and 
accompanying text. Therefore, its probability must be taken as equal to zero. Furthermore, if 
q is impossible, then so must be p&q, and thus the probability of p&q also equals zero. 
Hence, the probability of pVq equals the probability of p plus zero minus zero, or simply, 
the probability of p. 
44. Modal logic is the logic of necessity and possibility. See generally C. LEWIS & C. 
LANGFORD, SYMBOLIC LOGIC (1932) (providing a comprehensive method for developing a system 
of modal logic); G. VON WRIGHT, AN ESSAY IN MODAL LOGIC (1951). 
45. See infra notes 57-89 and accompanying text. 
46. D. SYNDER, MODAL LOGIC AND ITS APPLICATIONS 167-78 (1971) [hereinafter SNYDER). 
47. Snyder defines logical possibility rather than logical necessity and defines that possi-
bility as "requiring only that no logical rules be violated." [d. at 167. 
48. See id. at 168-70. 
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is not in the legal possession of the trespasser.49 Hence, it is concep-
tually necessary that if X trespassed on particular property, then X 
was not the legal possessor of the property. However, the same 
implication is not logically necessary. 50 Since an analysis of fact 
finding must occur within the context of instructions to the jury 
defining legal terms, conceptual necessity appears superior to logical 
necessity for the task at hand. 
Even conceptual necessity may not go far enough to provide the 
necessary analytic tools. It is not conceptually necessary that the sun 
rise in the east,51 yet it would seem reasonable that the system allow 
the inference that where two automobiles were oncoming, and the 
jury has found that one car was headed into the sunrise, the other 
was westbound. To allow such an inference requires that the concept 
of necessity be expanded52 to include pJ;"opositions that are theoreti-
cally necessary. Theoretically necessary propositions are those that 
are mandated by physical or scientific theory.53 Under such a view, 
driving into the sunrise and driving eastward (with various caveats 
regarding latitude and time of year) are necessarily equivalent. 
Having recognized that there may be some need to employ 
theoretical necessity, rather than limiting that analysis to logical or 
conceptual necessity, a word of caution is required. From a logical 
point of view, the theory on which theoretical necessity is based is 
irrelevant. So long as the premises of the theory are stated, other 
propositions may be found to be theoretically necessary. It is ob-
viously important to restrict the theories that may serve as the basis 
for establishing theoretically necessary propositions to well-accepted 
scientific or physical theories. If a proposition that is not logically 
49. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 68-69 (4th ed. 1971). 
50. Logical necessity does not arise from looking inside the logical particles - the simple 
or atomic propositions. Rather, it results from relations between those atomic propositions 
and complex propositions built up from them. For example, it is logically necessary that (p&q) 
implies p. Relations between complex propositions also create logical necessity. For example, 
it is logically necessary that (p&q) implies (p Vq). There is no logically necessary relation 
between p and q simply because the predicates they contain are related through some linguistic 
convention. 
51. It is not a linguistic convention that "east" and "place where the sun rises" denote 
the same direction. The terms are not related in the same way that "bachelor" and "unmarried 
man" are. Rather, it is scientific theory and ind~tion that allow the claim that it is theoretically 
necessary that the terms are equivalent. 
52. For the sense in which this is an expansion, see infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
5f See SNYDER, supra note 46, at 175. 
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or conceptually necessary must be taken as necessary in a particular 
analysis of fact finding, the question of whether or not the propo-
sition may be taken as necessary in the analysis should turn on 
whether a reasonable juror, given the generally accepted view of the· 
physical world, must take the proposition as true. 54 If so, the prop-
osition is theoretically necessary. 
While three different sorts of necessity have been identified, 
fortunately, it is not required that the three be kept distinct in 
analyzing fact finding. The three varieties are related in that any 
logically necessary proposition is conceptually necessary, and any 
conceptually necessary proposition is theoretically necessary. 55 Hence, 
for purposes of this effort, the modifiers may be dropped, and a 
proposition will be considered necessary if it is either logically nec-
essary, conceptually necessary, or necessary under well-accepted sci-
entific or physical theories. 
Having explicated the concept of necessity, we may now turn to 
the presentation of a logic that allows for the combination of 
necessary propositions and those found as fact to derive other prop-
ositions that may also be taken as found as fact. 56 In so doing, a 
certain amount of symbolization will be beneficial. Fp, Fq, etc. will 
be read 'p' is found, 'q' is found, etc. Lp, Lq, etc. will be read 'p' 
is necessary, 'q' is necessary, etc. In addition, symbols will be used 
to represent the various propositional connectives. The symbol & has 
already been chosen to represent and, while V has been chosen to 
represent or. Implication will be represented by -; so p -+ q will be 
read as "p implies q" or "if p, then q." Material equivalence will 
54. This standard should be viewed as more restrictive than the standard for review of 
factual findings by an appellate court. Such review is with regard to the evidence offered in 
the individual case, where the-evidence may have been in some conflict. In the case of necessary 
propositions, there should be a limitation to general statements of scientific or physical laws 
or the application of such laws to uncontested facts. 
55. Assuming that conceptualizations are more than mere word games, one can no more 
conceive of an unmarried male who is not a male than conceive of an unmarried male who 
is not a bachelor. Likewise, if necessity is based on the way in which predicates are used, the 
necessity must also be a theoretical necessity in any theory using the terms in their normal 
way. Snyder recognizes that it may at times be difficult to decide whether possibility (and thus 
necessity) is conceptual or theoretical; however, he argues for the nested relation among the 
types of possibility (and thus necessity). See SNYDER, supra note 46, at 176. 
56. The logic to be presented informally here and applied to special issue analysis is one 
of the logics developed formally for application to collateral estoppel analysis in Saunders, A 
Logic for the Analysis of Collateral Estoppel, 12 RUTGERS COMPo & TECH. L.l. 99 (1986) 
[hereinafter Saunders]. 
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be represented by -, and p - q will be read as "p if and only if 
q." Lastly, the negation of p will be symbolized as - p. Where 
compound propositions become sufficiently complex, parentheses will 
be employed to indicate the order in which connectives operate. 
For the logic to retain the analytic power enjoyed by proposi-
tional logic, the system must contain some formulation of that logic. 
Since the formal development and the distinctions between axioms 
and theorems are unimportant to the analysis at hand and are easily 
found elsewhere, 57 they will not be dealt with here. However, various 
aspects of propositional logic are important and are simply presented 
here without proof. 58 
The following express relationships between the propositions of 
propositional logic. They are labelled "PCI," "PC2," etc. for later 
ease of identification. 
PCI p&q is true if and only if p and q are both true. 
PC I may be viewed either as presenting a definition of how the 
connective & operates or as presenting a combination of inference 
schemes under which it is permissible to infer, from both p and q, 
p&q and to infer from p&q either p or q. 
PC2 p Vq is true if and only if either p is true or q is true. 59 
Similarly, PC2 may be viewed as a definition of Vor as an inference 
scheme that allows the inference of p V q from either p or q. 
PC3 p - q is true unless p is true and q is false. 60 
57. See, e.g., I. COP!, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 243-70 (3d ed. 1968); P. SUPPES, INTRO-
DUCTION TO LOGIC 1-42 (1957). 
58. In any formal development of propositional logic, some theses will be taken as axioms 
and will remain unproved. Here, no attempt is made to distinguish the axioms from theorems, 
or for that matter the theses (axioms and theorems) from inference schemes or definitions of 
the connectives. 
59. This is the non-exclusive use of or. The exclusive or may be represented in the logic 
as (pVq)&-(p&q). 
60. The implication indicated is a material implication in which there need not be any 
connection between the antecedent and consequent other than that the former not be true 
while the latter is false. Certain unhappiness with material implication, in that a logically 
contradictory proposition implies any other proposition and a logically necessary proposition 
is implied by any other proposition, has been a factor in the development of the modal logic 
systems on which the logic presented here is built. 
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PC3 is best viewed as a definition of-, although the inference 
schemes known as modus ponens and modus tol/ens, presented as 
PC6 and PC7, respectively, are based on the definition presented as 
PC3. 
PC4 P - q is true if and only if p and q are both true or 
both false. Alternatively, p-q is true if and only if p-q and 
q - p are both true. 
Again, PC4 serves not only as a definition, but also allows the 
inference of either implication from the equivalence or biconditional 
and the equivalence or biconditional from the two implications taken 
together. 
PC5 -pis true if p is false and is false if p is true. 61 
PC5 presents the relationship between a proposition and its negation. 
It is more purely definitional than PC1 through PC4, although it 
too may serve as the basis for an inference of p from - - p, or of 
- - p from p, as in PC20. 
PC6 through PClO are non-definitional but present inference 
schemes for deriving a true proposition from the truth or falsity of 
other propositions. 
PC6 If p-q and p are both true, then q is true. 62 
PC7 If p-q is true ane! q is false, p is false. 63 
PC8 If p-q and q-r are true, then so is p-r. 
PC9 If p- rand q ..... r are both true, so is (pVq)-r. 
PClO If p Vq is true and p is false, q is true. 
There are also certain statements that are theses of propositional 
logic. Which of them are taken as axioms and which are to be 
proven as theorems may vary from one development of propositional 
logic to another, but all are true in propositional logic. 
61. It is common to think of - as a connective, even though it does not serve to join 
two or more propositions. The connectives could instead be called operators, with &, V, -
and - as binary operators and - as a unary operator. 
62. This inference scheme is often referred to as modus ponens. 
63. This inference scheme is often referred to as modus tol/ens. 
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PCll p-(pVq) 
PC12 (p&q)-(pVq) 
PC13 -(p-q)-(p&-q) 
PC14 (-pVq)-(p-q) 
PC 15 - (p&q) - ( - p V - q) 
PC16 -(pVq)-( -p& -q} 
PC17 p-(q-(p&q)) 
PC18 (p-(q-r))-((p&q)-r) 
PC19 (p-q)-(-q--p) 
PC20 -(-p)-p 
PC2l (p&q)-(q&p) 
PC22 (pVq)-(qVp) 
PC23 (p-q)- ((p-q)&(q-p)) 
[Vol. 19:37 
In each of PCl through PC23, any variable may be uniformly 
replaced by any formula that makes sense in the logic64 and the result 
will hold true in propositional logic. For example, from PC7 "If 
(p&r)-q is true and q is false, then p&r is false" may be derived, 
and from PC20, -(-(-p))-p is a thesis of propositional logic. 
This rule of uniform substitution holds true even when a variable is 
uniformly replaced by a formula involving findings or necessary 
truths, but substitutions must be made carefully. For example, from 
PC5, if Fp is false - Fp is true, but PC5 does not lead to the 
conclusion that F( - p) is true.65 
If the logic is to encompass necessary truths, the propositional 
logic must be expanded to include the basis for a modal logic. One 
of the simpler modal logics is that presented by Feys66 and by von 
Wright. 67 Those equivalent systems require the addition of two axioms 
64. Making sense in the logic, as opposed to truth or falsity, is a grammatical question. 
Those propositions that "make sense" are those that are "well-formed", that is, built up 
according to certain formation rules. 
The formation rules for the system presented here are as follow: 
Any variable, p, q, r, etc. standing alone is a well-formed formula. 
If ex is a well-formed formula, so also are - ex, and Lex. 
If ex and B are well-formed formulas, so also are (ex&B), (ex VB), (ex-B), and (ex -B). 
Where no confusion would result, parentheses may be dropped. 
See a/so infra note 7S (giving an additional formation rule). 
6S. See infra notes IS0-SI and accompanying text. 
66. Feys, Les Logiques nouvelles des moda/ites, 40 REVUE NEOSCOLASTIQUE DE PmLOsoPHIE 
S17 (1937). 
67. VON WRIGHT, supra note 44 at 8-28. 
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and one inference scheme to a basis for propositional logic.68 The 
two modal logic axioms, designated MLJ and ML2, follow. 
MLl Lp-p. Expressed in more ordinary language, if p is 
necessary, p is true. 
ML2 L(p-q)-(Lp-Lq). Again, in more ordinary language, 
if p necessarily implies q, then if p is necessarily true, q is 
necessarily true. 
The additional inference scheme, designated ML3, provides: 
ML3 If p is a thesis, so is Lp. 
Since MLl through ML3 are not as intuitively obvious as PC 1 
through PC23, and since the remainder of the logic depends on their 
acceptance, some discussion would be beneficial. ML1 simply states 
that those things that are necessarily true may be taken as true in 
the logical system. If a proposition is tautological (and hence is 
logically true), is necessitated by the way in which linguistic terms 
are employed (and hence is conceptually necessary), or is such that 
a juror must take the proposition as true given generally accepted 
scientific and physical theory (and hence is theoretically necessary), 
then the proposition may be taken as actually true. Note that the 
truth of the proposition is dependent on the basis for the necessity. 
If logic were different, or if linguistic terms were used differently 
than they are, or if the world were seen as different than the accepted 
scientific view, the proposition would no longer be necessarily true 
and need not be actually true. However, it should be assumed that 
the jury will operate under rules of logic, employ linguistic terms in 
the way dictated by language,69 and operate within scientific or 
68. As with propositional logic, various formulations of the particular modal logic under 
discussion would also be possible. The distinction between axioms and theorems is, therefore, 
of no greater relevance here than for the propositional logic. However, whereas the theses of 
propositional logic all seem rather intuitively acceptable, the same may not be true for modal 
logic. Arguing for the acceptance of the logic is then made easier by arguing for the acceptability 
of a small number of axioms and inference schemes and then showing that the acceptability 
of the remaining theses follows logically from the already accepted axioms and inference 
schemes. 
69. There is, of course, always ambiguity in language. But, those instances in which 
conceptual necessity is properly posited are cases in which there is no room for ambiguity. 
For example, it is conceptually necessary that a bachelor be unmarried. This is not to say that 
there will not be questionable cases. For example, even if it is assumed that "all ravens are 
black" is necessary, it is unclear whether the necessity is conceptual or theoretical. That is. is 
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physical theory.7o Under these assumptions, Lp-p would appear to 
be acceptable. 
ML2 may be likened to a strong form of modus ponens. 71 It 
states that if p is necessarily true and p necessarily implies q, then 
q is necessarily true. If under any conceivable state of affairs, p 
implies q, and under any conceivable state of affairs p is true, then 
under each of the conceivable states of affairs, by modus ponens, q 
would be true. So, q is also true under every conceivable state of 
affairs. 72 
The additional inference scheme, ML3, states that if a formula 
can be proven to be a thesis of the logical system, then it may be 
taken as necessary. In this regard it is important to point out that 
for a formula to be a thesis, it must be proved without reference to 
any assumptions, that is, its proof must involve only the axioms and 
inference schemes. 73 Since the formula has been proven to stand 
without reference to any actual state of affairs, as expressed by 
hypotheses, the proposition must be true under any possible state of 
affairs and is, therefore, necessary. 
Accepting the additional axioms and the new inference scheme 
requires the acceptance of the following theorems, which may be 
proved using propositional logic and the added axioms and inference 
scheme.74 
ML4 L(p&q) -(Lp&Lq) 
ML5 Lp--L(q--p) 
ML6 (LpVLq)-L(pVq) 
blackness inherent in the concept of ravenness or is the conclusion inductively based? See 
SNYDER, supra note 46, at 176-77; W. QUINE, FROM A LOG.ICAL POINT OF VIEW 20-46 (1953). 
70. The conclusion, of course, rests on the assumption of the linguistic conventions and 
the acceptance of the scientific theory. While there may be debate over either, the logic will 
point out just what propositions must be taken as necessary in any particular analysis. At that 
point, the work of the logic is done. Any further debate is linguistic or scientific. 
71. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
72. Saul A. Kripke presents a proof of the relative consistency of the axiomatic basis for 
the modal logic developed thus far. He establishes a set-theoretic model of the system, which 
proves that any inconsistency in the modal system can only be one that is already present in 
set theory. See Kripke, Seman tical Analysis of Modal Logic I: Normal Modal Propositional 
Calculi, 9 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR MATHEMATISCHE LOGIK UND GRUNDLAGEN DER MATHEMATIK 67 
(1963) [hereinafter Kripke). 
73. Since the axioms and inference schemes define the logic, they are logically necessary, 
and any formula that follows logically from those axioms and inference schemes must also be 
logically necessary. 
74. Proofs of the theo~ems ML4 through MLiO may be found in G. HUGHES & M. 
CRESSWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODAL LOGIC 34-40 (1st ed. 2d paperback ed. 1977). 
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Additionally, if the symbol M, read "possibly", isoadded to "the 
logic,7S and is defined as - L( - p), that is, p is possible if and only 
if -pis not necessary, then the following theorems may be proved. 
ML7 Lp- -M(-p) 
ML8 M(pVq)-(MpVMq) 
ML9 M(p&q)-(Mp&Mq) 
MLlO L(P-)-(Mp-Mq) 
Now that the logic is capable of handling concepts of necessity 
and possibility, one more extension is all that is required for the 
logic to be capable of handling findings of fact. The addition of five 
axioms is required. 76 
MLII Lp-Fp 
MLl2 -(Fp&F(-p)) 
MLl3 F(p&q)-(Fp&Fq) 
MLl4 (Lp&F(p-q))-Fq 
MLl5 (Fp&L(p-q))-Fq 
Since, once again, the axioms presented are not as intuitive as 
the theses of propositional logic, and since the remainder of the logic 
depends for its acceptability on the acceptance of the axioms, some 
discussion is necessary. MLll states that if p is necessarily true, p 
is found as fact or must be taken as found as fact. If p is logically 
necessary, or must be true because of the way in which linguistic 
terms are used, or is required by well-accepted scientific or physical 
theory, then p is such that its truth must be accepted by any juror, 
and the jury may be taken to have found p, or it may be concluded 
that the jury would have found p had the issue been considered. 
ML12 states simply that - p and p cannot both be found in the 
same jury deliberation. 77 Since even the weakest standard of proof, 
75. The additional formation rule required is: If ex is a well-formed formula, so also is 
M ex. See supra note 64. 
76. See supra note 68. 
77. Indeed, this is the problem raised in cases of conflicting findings on special issues. 
The standard developed by the courts for requiring a new trial goes beyond a simple violation 
of axiom ML12 and requires a form of materiality. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying 
text. 
HeinOnline -- 19 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 54 1988
54 TEXAS TECH LA W REVIEW [Vol. 19:37 
proof by a preponderance, requires that the found proposition be 
more likely than not,78 p and - p cannot both be found. If both 
were found, p would be more likely than - p and - p would be 
more likely than p. That is, the probability of p would both exceed 
and be less than the probability of - p, a clearly unacceptable result. 
ML13 states that if p&q taken together is found then each 
individually may be taken as found. In any instance in which p&q 
is true, p will be true, as will q. Hence, if p&q proves true in the 
required proportion of alternative states of affairs, p and q will be 
true with at least as great a frequency, and each may be taken as 
found. 
ML14 and ML15 allow for inferences to be drawn from findings. 
Rather than allowing a finding of q to be derived from findings of 
p and of p_q,19 the logic requires that either p or p-q be necessary. 
Both axioms appear acceptable. ML14 states that if p is necessarily 
true, and p more likely than not implies q, then q is more likely 
than not true. 80 If p must be true, then in any instance in which 
p--q is true, q will also have to be true. If the probability of p-q 
rises to the necessary level, the probability of q will have risen to at 
least that level 81 and will also have reached the level required for a 
finding~ Similarly, as stated in MLI5, if p is found and it is necessary 
that whenever p is true q is true, then q may be taken as foundY 
Having accepted the additional axioms,83 the following theorems 
follow. 84 
78. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 339, at 957 
(3d ed. 1984) ("The most acceptable meaning to be given to the expression, proof by a 
preponderance, seems to be proof which leads the jury to find that the existence of the 
contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence. "). 
79. An attempt to imply Fq from Fp and F(p-q) would lead to probability level problems 
similar to those that lead to the rejection of any attempt to derive F(p&q) from Fp and Fq. 
See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the problem as it 
relates to implications, see COHEN, supra note 21, at 68-73; Saunders, supra note 56, at 101-
02. 
80. Taking findings as established by clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt will not change the analysis. 
81. In fact, the probability of q will equal the probability of p_q. Since p is always true, 
whenever p- q is true, so is q. And, whenever q is true, by PC3, p-q will also be true. 
82. The probability of q may exceed the probability of p but may not be lower, since q 
must be true whenever p is true and q may also be true without p being true. 
83. The Kripke models, see Kripke, supra note 72, may be extended to provide a proof 
of the relative consistency of the extension of the logic provided by MLII through MLl4. See 
Saunders, supra note 56, at 104-05 n.24-26, 108-10 n.33. 
84. For proofs of theorems MLl5 through ML22, see Saunders, supra note 56, at 117 
app. 1. 
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ML16 Fp--F(pVq) 
MU7 F(-p)--Fp 
MU8 Fq-F(p--q) 
MU9 F(p&q) - F(p V q) 
ML20 (F(pVq)&L( -p))--Fq 
ML21 L(p=;q)-(Fp--Fq) 
ML22 (Lp&Fq)--F(p&q) 
ML23 Fp--Mp 
55 
The addition of the axioms ML 11 through ML 15 completed the 
logic,85 and led to theorems ML16 through ML23. Armed with the 
theses of the logic, the cases considering special issue conflicts may 
be analyzed. But before turning to that task, a brief word on 
argument techniques would be profitable. 
One powerful technique employs what is known as the deduction 
theorem. The deduction theorem states that if one is attempting to 
prove a conditional, the proof may proceed by taking the antecedent 
of the conditional as a hypothesis and from the hypothesis proving 
the consequent. If the proof of the consequent is completed, the 
conditional may then be taken as proven. The deduction system does 
hold in a system using the inference schemes employed here. 86 
A second technique is indirect inference or reductio ad absurdum. 
Indirect inference allows proof of a proposition p by assuming its 
negation, - p, and showing that the acceptance of -pleads to a 
contradiction. Similarly, - p may be proved by assuming p and 
showing that such an assumption leads to a contradiction. Indirect 
inference is also a valid form of reasoning in the logical system. 87 
Lastly, it is permissible to substitute an equivalent formula into 
any formula that is not a finding. 88 It is also acceptable to substitute 
a necessarily equivalent formula into formulas that are findings. 89 
85. Saunders, supra note 56, at 112-14 extends the logic to contend with situations in 
which modalities are iterated, such as MLp, FLMp, etc. The treatment of iterations is 
unimportant to the analysis to be undertaken infra, but if situations should arise, the axioms 
and theorems that allow for the inference ,of simpler modalities are found id. at 113-14. 
86. See Zeman, The Deduction Theorem in S4, S4.2 and S5, 8 NOTRE DAME J. OF FORMAL 
LOGIC 56 (1967). 
87. Indirect inference follows from the deduction theorem in any propositional calculus 
basis. 
88. See G. HUGHES & M. CRESSWELL, supra note 74, at 33-37. 
89. See Saunders, supra note 56, at 111 n.36. 
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III. RESOLVING SPECIAL ISSUE CONFLICTS 
The Texas courts have developed what is, in effect, a two-step 
test for reversing a judgment due to a fatal conflict between jury 
findings on material special issues. The first step, which is not 
generally discussed in the literature nor found to present much 
difficulty, is identifying the two (or more) findings that conflict. 90 
The second step is showing that the conflict is material. The two 
findings must not only conflict; but they must also lead to different 
judgments. Thus, if one finding is accepted and the conflicting finding 
ignored, one judgment must result, while if the other finding is 
instead accepted, the opposite judgment must result. 91 
While identification of what is to be considered as a conflict, 
as opposed to a material conflict, may have created no great diffi-
culties, it is important to a logical analysis. That is particularly so 
when the logic offers more than one combination of propositions 
that might be viewed as a conflict. In the logic presented here, there 
are two such combinations. One such case, is equivalent to a con-
tradiction in propositional logic. In such a case, the jury may have 
been asked if they find p and have answered in the negative. In a 
separate special issue they may have been asked if they find p, or 
more likely some finding from which a finding of p may be inferred,92 
and have answered affirmatively. The result is a conflict between Fp 
and _Fp.93 
90. The courts do not present the analysis as being in two steps, but must in fact, first 
identify the findings said to conflict. Where the issues conflict squarely, no logical analysis or 
discussion of the issue is required. Where the conflict is not so direct, at least some discussion 
is required. For example, in discerning a conflict between findings that plaintiff and defendant 
were both negligent and a finding that the accident was unavoidable, the Supreme Court of 
Texas considered the meaning of "unavoidable accident" and determined that, as a matter of 
law, it required a lack of negligence on the part of anyone. See A.B.C. Stores, Inc. v. Taylor, 
136 Tex. 89, 90, 148 S.W.2d 392, 393 (1941). For a complete discussion of Taylor, see, infra 
notes 112-19 and accompanying text. 
91. See infra text accompanying note 97. 
92. For example, p and p&q may both have been submitted as special issues, and the 
jury may have failed to find p but have found p&q. But, F(p&q) implies Fp, see MLl3, so 
the result is Fp and - Fp, a contradiction. 
The example presents a case of inartful submission of special issues. The two issues should 
not both have been submitted. Either p&q should have been the only issue submitted, or p 
and q could both have been submitted and the conjunction omitted. While inartful, it is not 
unheard of for one submitted special issue to encompass another. See, e.g., Traywick v. 
Goodrich, 364 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. 1963). For a complete discussion of Traywick, see infra notes 
126-40 and accompanying text. 
93. For examples of such conflicts, see infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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Another sort of conflict arises when the jury has been asked if 
they find p, and they have answered affirmatively, while in another 
situation they have answered affirmatively when asked if they find 
- p.94 Here the contradiction is not a direct contradiction of prop-
ositional logic. In symbols, the result is Fp and F( - p). The two 
findings are not negations of each other, and hence there is no pure 
propositional logic contradiction. There is, however, a contradiction 
resulting from the combined findings within the logic. While they do 
not conflict logically with each other, taken in conjunction, they 
conflict with axiom ML12, which states - (Fp&F( - p)). Thus, the 
contradiction that would be intuitively expected to exist between Fp 
and F( - pj95 does transfer into some contradiction in the logic. 
Once the conflict is identified, the test for materiality is applied. 
Not all conflicts between special issue findings will serve to upset a 
judgment. Rather, the conflict has to be relevant to the verdict. One 
of the more recent statements of the relevance or materiality test was 
presented in Norris v. Branham. 96 
[T]he Court must consider each of the answers claimed to be in 
conflict, disregarding the alleged conflicting answer but taking 
into consideration all of the rest of the verdict, and if, so consid-
ered, one of the answers would require a judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff and the other would require a judgment in favor of 
the defendant, then the answers are fatally in conflict. 97 
Clearly, two answers may conflict in a logical sense,98 but if the 
conflict does not translate into an effect on the judgment, the 
judgment will stand. 
The test presents an interesting, perhaps intuitive, understanding 
of the effect of a contradiction within a logical analysis. If p and 
94. Again, it is more likely that either Fp or F( - p) was hidden in the sense that it was 
implied by a more complex finding. See supra note 92. 
95. For a case in which such a situation has been treated as a conflict, see A.B.C. Stores, 
Inc. v. Taylor, 136 Tex. 89, 148 S.W.2d 392 (1941). Taylor is discussed more fully infra notes 
112-19 and accompanying text. 
96. 557 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1977. writ ref'd n.r.e.). 
97. [d. at 817 (quoting Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 206, 222 
S.W.2d 985, 991 (1949». 
98. p and - p conflict in propositional logic. While Fp and F( - p) do not directly conflict 
with each other, taken together the conjunction conflicts with axiom ML13, so Fp and F( - p) 
might reasonably be viewed as conflicting within the logical system in that they cannot both 
be true. As an aside, it is interesting to note that while p and - p cannot both be true, neither 
may both be false. While Fp and F( - p) might both be false, as where the evidence is even, 
both cannot be true. See infra note 150 and accompanying text. 
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- p are both premises of a logical argument or provable in that 
argument, then absolutely any other proposition may be proved. 
(p& - p)-q is a tautology of propositional logic, no matter for what 
q may stand or by what it may be replaced. Since the antecedent 
p& - p can never be true, the conditional (p& - p)-q can never be 
false. But if the contradiction of p and -pis taken to be true in a 
particular argument, then q may be inferred. Hence, once a contra-
diction enters an analysis, anything may be proved, including that 
the judgment must be for the defendant and that the judgment must 
be for the plaintiff. 
The test avoids the problem of being able to prove anything 
from the contradiction by dropping in turn each of the contradictory 
findings and determining the effect of the remaining finding on the 
judgment. Thus, if the judgments in the two cases conflict, it is not 
due simply to the fact that one logical contradiction leads to all 
other logical contradictions, but rather because the conflicting judg-
ments are logically tied to and paired with the conflicting findings. 
The logic may be of help at both stages of the testing of special 
issue findings for contradictions. First, some logical analysis may be 
required in determining whether there is any contradiction, relevant 
to the judgment or not, between the special issues found. If one or 
both of Fp and - Fp or of Fp and F( - p) is buried within a more 
complex finding, the form of the more complex finding must be 
subjected to logical analysis to determine whether the contradictory 
findings can be extricated in a form where the conflict still exist. For 
example, Fp and F( - p Vq) may appear to conflict, since p and - p 
both occur within findings. However, since F( - p) may not be 
inferred from F( - p Vq),99 there is actually no contradiction. On the 
other hand, the logic demonstrates that there is a contradiction 
between Fp and F( _ p&q). 100 
A more complex situation is presented by cases in which there 
is an alleged contradiction between findings that, in form, appear to 
be Fp and Fq. The argument must be made that the contradiction 
99. Since pVq is true whenever either p or q or both-p and q are true, the probability of 
pVq must be greater than or equal to the probability of either p or of q. Since the probability 
of p may be less than the probability of p Vq, the fact that the probability of p Vq is sufficiently . 
high to take pVq as a finding, does not g~rantee that the probability of p will also be 
sufficiently high. 
100. F(-p&q) implies F(-p) by ML13 and PCI. 
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is actually between a proposition that may be in.ferred to have been 
found and one of the actual findings. In such a case, it is important 
to know what is required to infer the hidden finding. For example, 
if in addition to Fp and Fq, the court is willing to conclude that it 
is necessary that Fp imply F( - q), 101 then F( - q) may be inferred and 
the contradiction with Fq made explicit. 102 The logic leads to an 
understanding of the unstated premises that would be necessary to 
develop the contradiction. The court may then examine each of the 
required premises to determine whether each is acceptable and the 
contradiction results. 
Turning to the second step of the analysis, the logic is also 
useful in determining the relevance or materiality of the contradiction. 
For the contradiction to affect the judgment, one result must flow 
from one of the findings and the opposite judgment from the 
contradictory finding.l°3 Clearly, whether the judgment flows from 
the finding in each case is subject to logical analysis. The demon-
stration for each of the contradictory findings that it leads to one 
of the two conflicting judgments should be ". more or less formal 
logical demonstration. The more formal the demonstration, the greater 
the likelihood that any unstated premises in the argument from 
finding to judgment will be discovered and the acceptability of those 
unstated premises subject to non-logical legal analysis. An argument 
within the context of the logic may then be of value in showing that 
the contradiction is relevant by demonstrating that the opposing 
judgments do flow from the contradictory findings. 
Demonstration of irrelevance is more difficult,I04 but still the 
logic may be helpful. If the two contradictory findings do not lead 
101. Such a conclusion might be based on an explanatory jury instruction that defined p 
in terms that required - q, as in defining "trespass" as including the fact that the trespasser 
not legally possess the property in question. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
The conclusion lllight alternatively be based on logical, scientific, or physical necessity. See 
supra notes 46~55 and accompanying text. For example, from a finding that defendant was in 
New York on a particular date and at a particular time, the court could infer a finding that 
defendant was not in San Francisco at the same time on the same date. 
102. A similar analysis might uncover - Fq as implicit in Fp and a contradiction with Fq 
would thereby be made explicit. 
103. See supra text accompanying note 97. 
104. Relevance may be shown by demonstrating that the opposing judgments follow from 
the contradictory findings. An inability to show that mutually exclusive judgments follow 
should not, however, serve as the basis for concluding that the contradiction is immaterial. 
The inability may not be due to irrelevance but rather to the lack of logical ability on the 
part of the person attempting to construct a logical argument that might be found by another. 
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to opposing judgments, then either they lead to the same judgment 
or at least one of the findings does not lead anywhere. Demonstration 
that the two findings lead to the same judgment is easier in the logic. 
A logical argument similar to arguments demonstrating the· opposite 
judgments of a relevant contradiction may be used to show the same 
judgment flowing from each of the contradictory findings. In such 
a situation, either the other findings were independently adequate to 
reach the judgment105 or there were alternative theories supporting 
the judgment with Fp a part of one theory and - Fp or F( - p) a 
part of the other theory. 
Showing that one or both of the findings fails to lead anywhere 
with regard to the judgment or its opposite is not subject to direct 
argument within the logic. Except in the case where it can be shown 
that Fp leads to the opposing judgment, it cannot be demonstrated 
in the logic that a judgment does not follow from Fp. Instead, a 
metalogical argument 106 must be presented examining the workings 
of the logic, the premises and the judgment, and demonstrating 
informallylO7 the irrelevance of the finding in question. Alternatively, 
a model might be developed in which Fp is true and one judgment 
holds, and another model developed in which Fp is true and in which 
the opposing judgment holds. lOB 
To demonstrate how the logic may be of value in special issue 
conflict analysis, a look at some of the cases in which the problem 
arises should be of value. The general discussion of the usefulness 
of the logic in such analysis may become more clear when looked at 
in action and in context. 
IV. A LOOK AT THE CASES 
With the required logic now in hand, it would be useful to look 
at the analysis the courts have employed in considering claims of 
conflict in special issue findings. This look may serve two purposes. 
105. In such a situation, the findings might actually be better viewed as leading nowhere 
in terms of the judgments involved. 
106. A metalogical argument is an argument about the logic rather than an argument 
within the logic. 
107. A metalogical argument may be rigorous and may even be formal within the context 
of another logic. It will not, however, be a formal logical argument within the logic it is being 
used to discuss. For example, Section II of this article is a metalogical discussion of the logic 
presented in that section. 
108. See Saunders, supra note 56, at 122 app. 2. See also infra note 151. 
HeinOnline -- 19 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 61 1988
1988] SPECIAL ISSUE CONFLICTS 61 
First, the attempt to make the courts' reasoning fit the logic will 
provide an opportunity to gain additional acquaintance with the logic 
presented in the earlier sections. Further, attempting to make the 
courts' reasoning explainable in terms of the logic should help to 
make clear just what the courts' reasoning was. 
While the courts' major conclusions with regard to legal theory 
in this arealO9 have centered on the second prong of testing conflicting 
issues, the relevance consideration,11O considerable effort has been 
given in individual cases to applying the first prong, establishing or 
explaining away a conflict. 111 Consider first A.B.C. Stores, Inc. v. 
Taylor,1I2 a rather short opinion in which the greater effort was 
expended on the first prong of the test. A.B.C. Stores involved 
Taylor's fall over a box of merchandise in the aisle of a store. The 
jury found that defendant store had been negligent, but also found 
that plaintiff had been guilty of contributory negligence and further 
found that the accident had been unavoidable. 1I3 The Supreme Court 
of Texas held these findings to be in conflict, noting: "This finding 
[of unavoidable accident], carrying with it, as it does, the further 
finding that neither plaintiff nor defendant was gUilty of negligence, 
is in conflict with the finding that plaintiff was contributorily neg-
ligent, as well as the finding that defendant was negligent." 114 
Turning to a logical analysis of this conflict, it would be useful 
to let p, q, and r stand for the relevant findings, as follows: 
p: Plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
q: Defendant was negligent. 
r: The accident was unavoidable. 
The jury's conclusions may then be expressed as: Fp, Fq, and 
Fr. There appears to be no conflict among the three findings, but 
just as the court had to look within one of the findings to establish 
a conflict, a look at the logical relations between p, q, and r will 
show the conflict between Fp, Fq, and Fr. The court stated that the 
finding of unavoidable accident carried with it findings of no negli-
gence on the part of the defendant and no contributory negligence 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97. 
110. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
Ill. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. 
112. 136 Tex. 89, 148 S.W.2d 392 (1941). 
113. [d. at 90, 148 S.W.2d at 393 .. 
114. [d., 148 S.W.2d at 393. 
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on the part of the piaintiffI 15 and thus there existed a conflict. For 
the conflict to be derivable in the logic, the court must have been 
willing to conclude: 
(1) L (r-(-p&-q&s)) 
wheres is the conjunction of various other facts, although s might also be 
empty. From (1) and from PC4, defining equivalence, 
(2) L((r - (-p& - q&s))&(( - p& - r&s) - r)) 
may be derived. Since the necessity of a conjunction implies the necessity 
of each conjunct, ML4 and PCl yield 
(3) L (r- (-p&-q&s)). 
But, since Fr also obtains, then by ML15, one may conclude 
(4) F( - p& - q&s). 
Since finding a conjunction implies finding either conjunct, ML13 
and PC1 yield both F(-p) and F(-q). Fr then conflicts with both 
Fp and Fq. 
The sole premise needed to show the conflict was the proposition 
presented in (1). So long as the court was willing to assert the 
necessary equivalencel16 of unavoidable accident and a conjunction 
involving lack of negligence on the part of either party, the remainder 
of the demonstration of conflict followed logically. The equivalence 
needed as a premise is not a product of the logic. It must be 
established by extra-logical means, such as an understanding of the 
law and how legal terms relate to one another. The court was willing 
to assert the premise in this case,117 and demonstration of a conflict 
became clear. 
Again, it should be pointed out that the demonstration of a 
conflict between, or in this case among, special issue findings is only 
115. [d. at 90-91. 148 S.W.2d at 393. 
116. The court could have come to the same conclusion by determining that r necessarily 
implied - p& - q&s rather than holding that the two are equivalent. Such an approach, which 
could well be viewed as a fair reading of the case, would simply shorten the logical analysis 
by allowing the argument to begin with step (3) in the text. 
117. 136 Tex. at 90, 148 S.W.2d at 393. See also TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 3.03 
(1969). 
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the first step of the test for upsetting a judgment. Relevance or 
materiality must still be determined. In A.B.C. Stores; the second 
prong was dispensed with rather quickly. The court simply stated 
that the finding of contributory negligence would ordinarily require 
a judgment in favor of the defendant, a judgment the trial court 
had entered, but that the finding of unavoidable accident conflicted 
with the finding of contributory negligence, as well as with the 
finding of negligence by defendant. 118 The court held that judgment 
should not have been entered for defendant and remanded the case 
for another trial. 119 
The analytic framework for evaluating the relevance of special 
issue conflicts, as later stated in cases such as Norris v. Branham l20 
and Little Rock Furniture Manufacturing Co. v. Dunn,121 was not 
employed by the A.B.C. Stores court. The court did not omit one 
of the conflicting findings and determine the judgment required by 
the remaining finding, and, in turn, do the same for the other 
conflicting findings, and determine whether there was also a conflict 
in the judgments that would result. 122 Rather, the court seemed simply 
to assume that the conflict was fataL 
It is, of course, true that the 1941 decision in A.B.C. Stores 
preceded by eight years the Texas Supreme Court's adoption of the 
relevance test as stated in Little Rock Furniture. However, Little 
Rock Furniture, in establishing the origins of the test, traced it as 
far back as a 1937 case of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, Howard 
v. Howard.123 Thus, a form of the test did exist,124 although it had 
not been adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas at the time A.B.C. 
Stores was decided. 
While the failure to apply the relevancy test might then have 
118. 136 Tex. at 91,148 S.W.2d at 393. 
119. [d. at 91,148 S.W.2d at 393. 
120. 557 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 
121. 148 Tex. 197, 206, 222 S.W.2d 985, 991 (1949). 
122. See supra text accompanying note 97. 
123. 102 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937, writ ref'd). 
124. The test in Howard was stated as "whether taking the finding alone in the one 
instance, a judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiff; and taking it alone in the 
other, judgment should be entered in favor of the defendant." [d. at 475 (emphasis added). 
If "alone" is read to omit all other findings, the test is different from that currently in use 
and that adopted in Little Rock Furniture. Such a reading would, however, be untenable. 
Seldom will anything flow from one finding taken in isolation. "Alone" must, instead, be 
taken as meaning "without the other conflicting finding," and the Howard and Little Rock 
Furniture tests seen as differing only as to the words chosen to explain the test. 
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been due to historical factors, there also exists a difficulty in applying 
the test to the three findings in A.B.C. Stores, since the statement 
of the test in Howard and Little Rock Furniture appears to envision 
a situation in which there were two findings in conflict. By simply 
asserting that the conflict was fatal, the court avoided the problem 
of applying the test to three findings, until forced to do so in a later 
case. 125 
A second case, which turned solely on the first prong of the test 
and failed to establish a conflict, was Traywick v. Goodrich. 126 
Traywick grew out of a collision between defendant's truck and 
plaintiff's automobile. In response to Special Issue No.9, the jury 
found that plaintiff "failed to maintain a proper lookout on the 
occasion in question and that such failure was a proximate cause of 
the collision. "127 In response to Special Issue No. 13, the jury found 
that plaintiff "failed to ascertain or determine that the way was clear 
for her to enter the intersection, but that such failure was not 
negligence."128 Let p, q, r, and s stand for the following propositions: 
p: Plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout on the 
occasion in question. 
q: Plaintiff's failure to maintain a proper lookout was a 
proximate cause of the collision. 
r: Plaintiff failed to determine if the way was clear to enter 
the intersection. 
s: Plaintiff's failure to ascertain that the way was clear to 
enter the intersection was negligent. 
The finding in response to Special Issue No.9 was F(p&q), and the 
finding in response to Special Issue No. 13 was F(r& -s). ML13 and 
PCl then yield Fp, Fq, Fr, and F( -s). 
There is no obvious conflict between or among any of the 
findings. What conflict there may be must be due to some relation 
between p, q, r, and s. The Supreme Court of Texas, in concluding 
that there was no irreconcilable conflict,129 considered the relationship 
125. Application of the test to three conflicting findings was required in Bradford v. 
Arhelger, 161 Tex. 422, 340 S.W.2d 772 (1960). For a complete discussion of Bradford, see 
infra notes 175·87 and accompanying text. 
126. 364 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. 1963). 
127. [d. at 190. 
128. [d. at 190-91. 
129. The court did not explain "irreconcilable conflict," but presumably such a conflict is 
one which, under examination, proves to be a logical contradiction in one of the forms 
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between the findings and noted: 
Special Issue No. 9 is all-inclusive on the question as to whether 
the plaintiff kept and maintained the proper observation at all 
times on approaching, entering into and after she had entered 
upon the intersection ... [,while] No. 13 inquires as to her 
conduct before entering the intersection. That issue is necessarily 
embraced within but not coextensive with Special Issue No. 9. 130 
There are, of course, various ways in which one issue may be 
embraced within another, and determining whether there is a conflict 
requires an examination of how Special Issue No. 13 is embraced in 
Special Issue No.9. 
The simplest way in which one special issue may be embraced 
within another is for one special issue to be either a conjunction or 
disjunction and the other special issue to be one of the conjuncts or 
disjuncts of the first. More complex embracing might involve con-
junctions of disjunctions or disjunctions of conjunctions with the 
embraced issue as one of the simple propositions of the more complex 
finding. 13 ! In addition to these forms in which an issue might be 
embraced within another, !32 it is, of course, also possible that neither 
issue be embraced within the other but for there to be a conflict.133 
Fortunately, the embracing in the case at hand appears to be of 
not too complex a variety, but some analysis is still required to 
determine the nature, and thus the effect, of the embracing. The 
court stated that Special Issue No.9 was all-inclusive as to proper 
lookout at all times. Thus,.p might be viewed as the conjunction 
t&u& ... &z, where t, u, ... and z are propositions expressing the 
conclusion that plaintiff failed to maintain proper lookout at the 
various times involved. Taking t as the proposition relevant to the 
discussed supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. While "irreconcilable" might instead refer 
to relevance, that did not appear to be the thrust of the court's discussion. 
130. 364 S.W.2d at 191. 
131. Also included would be situations in which the embraced finding was not a simple 
proposition. For example, pVq is embraced within (sVt)&(pVq). 
132. Given the relationships between the various connectives, &, V, -, -, and -, any 
complex proposition may be written as an equivalent proposition that is either the conjunction 
of disjunctions in which each disjunct is either a simple proposition, a finding or a necessary 
proposition or the negation of such a proposition or may be written as a disjunction of 
conjunctions in which each conjunct is either a simple proposition, a finding or a necessary 
proposition or the negation of such a proposition. The first form is known as conjunctive 
normal form of the complex proposition, and the second is known as the disjunctive normal 
form of the complex proposition. See Blumberg, Modern Logic; 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
12, 17 (1967). For a presentation as to how to go about reducing a complex proposition to 
disjunctive normal form, see G. MASSEY, UNDERSTANDING SYMBOLIC LOGIC 67-71 (1970). 
133. The simple cases of Fp and -Fp or Fp and F(-p) provide examples. 
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time of entering the intersection, Fp would imply Ft, by ML13 and 
PCl. 
Since Ft does not explicitly conflict with any of the other 
findings, it too must be examined in order to uncover a conflict. Ft 
is a finding that plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout before 
entering the intersection. Proper lookout appears to resort to the 
reasonable person negligence standard. Hence, t might be read as 
"plaintiff failed to make sure the way was clear to enter the inter-
section, and such failure was negligent." Thus, t is necessarily 
equivalent to r&s. So a finding of t implies F(r&s), and thus Fr and 
Fs. Fs then conflicts with the Special Issue No. 13 finding of F( -s), 
and a contradiction is established. 
As seen another way, p may be viewed as the disjunction of t, 
u, ... and z. In that case Fp still implies F(tVuV ... Vz), but Fp 
does not imply the finding of any of the disjuncts and specifically 
does not imply Ft.n4 Since Ft cannot be derived, neither can Fs and 
there is no conflict. Since the court concluded that there was· no 
irreconcilable conflict, it appears that the court treated p as a 
disjunction, although other reasoning in the opinion makes that 
position less clear. 
The difficulty is that the court stated that Special Issue No. 13 
was embraced within Special Issue No.9 .. If p is treated as a 
conjunction then Issue 13 is embraced within Issue 9 to the degree 
the court appears to envision. Since p would be necessarily equivalent 
to t&u& . . . &z, and t is necessarily equivalent to r&s,135 p is 
necessarily equivalent to (r&s)&u&v . .. &z. Hence, Fp implies 
F((r&s)&u&v . .. &z), and thus by ML13 and PC1, Fp would imply 
Fr. Since Fr is not the totality of the finding in Special Issue No. 
13, and in fact the remainder of the findings in the special issues 
conflict, the actual finding of Special Issue No. 9 does not embrace 
the actual finding of Special Issue No. 13. However, in a logical 
sense, No.9, as a submission, does embrace No. 13. Since 
F((r&s)&u&v& ... &z) implies F(r&s), a jury answering Special Issue 
No. 9 in the affirmative would be required by the rules of logic to 
134. See supra note 99. 
135. The necessary equivalence is that drawn from the realm of conceptual or theoretical 
necessity. Proper lookout over a series of events is a conclusion to be drawn based on proper 
lookout at each of the events, and failure to keep proper lookout, within the context of legal 
language,. means keeping a lookout at a level that is negligent. 
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answer Special Issue No. 13 with a similar finding of failure to keep 
a lookout and negligence. Hence, under the assumption that Special 
Issue No. 9 is to be treated as a conjunction, Special Issue No. 9 
does embrace Special Issue No. 13, and the court is correct in stating 
that Special Issue No. 13 should not have been submitted.136 
If, on the other hand, Special Issue No. 9 should have been 
treated as a disjunction, Special Issue No.9 does not embrace Special 
Issue No. 13. A jury that has found F((r&s)VuVvV ... Vz) is not 
logically required to find F(r&s). 137 It is, in fact Special Issue No. 
13 that embraces Special Issue No.9, since by ML16, F(r&s) implies 
F((r&s) Vu Vv V . . . Vz). It is true that a jury that has failed to find 
F((r&s) Vu Vv V . . . Vz) would also be logically required to not find. 
F(r&s) , 138 but that seems an odd relationship to be characterized as 
embracing .139 
The analysis indicates that, if Special Issue No. 9 is treated as 
a conjunction, then Special Issue No. 9 does, as the court says, 
embrace Special Issue No. 13, but there is a conflict between the 
findings. On the other hand, if Special Issue No. 9 is treated as a 
disjunction, there is, as the court says, no irreconcilable conflict, but 
Special Issue No.9 does not embrace Special Issue No. 13. Instead, 
Special Issue No: 13 embraces Special Issue No.9. The court is 
wrong either in asserting that there is no irreconcilable conflict or in 
asserting that Special Issue No. 9 embrac~s Special Issue No. 13. 
The Traywick court's analysis does indicate which choice should 
be made. "The findings can be reconciled on the basis that [plaintiff] 
was not negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout while stopped 
and before attempting to enter the intersection, but that she was 
guilty of negligence in failing to keep a lookout thereafter. "140 The 
court states that the finding in Special Issue No.9 can be based on 
a finding of improper lookout at any of the times involved. Since 
136. See 364 S.W.2d at 191 ("[Ilt is clear that No. 13 should not have been given by the 
court"). 
137. See supra note 99. 
138. Since F(r&s) implies F((r&s)VuVvV ... Vz), a jury that did find F(r&s) would be 
logically required to find F((r&s)VuVvV ... Vz), which the jury failed to do. 
139. The most natural way to treat the claim that proposition p embraces proposition q 
would be that whenever p is true, q must also be true; that is, p implies q. Treating p 
embracing q as stating that if p is· false, so must q be false would be equivalent, by the logical 
rule of contraposition, to q implies p. It would indeed be odd in such a situation, to say that 
p embraces q. 
140. 364 S.W.2d at 191. 
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the truth of any of the disjuncts implies the truth of the disjunction, 
while the truth of even all but one of the conjuncts does not imply 
the truth of the conjunction, the court's reasoning clearly relies on 
Special Issue No. 9 being a disjunction. 
It must then be concluded that the court's error was in asserting 
that Special Issue No. 9 embraced Special Issue No. 13. However, 
the court was correct in noting that there is a logical relationship 
between the two special issues. It is, however, unclear which of the 
issues should not have been submitted. If it was only required to 
establish that plaintiff was negligent through failure to keep a proper 
lookout at some time, then Special Issue No. 9 was the better 
submission. If, however, there was any importance attached to the 
particular time at which the plaintiff was negligent, Special Issue No. 
9 should not have been submitted. Instead, Special Issue No. 13 
should have been submitted, along with special issues on negligence 
at each of the other relevant times. 
In Rhoades v. Castillo,141 plaintiff's pickup truck was struck 
by a tractor-trailer driven by defendant Castillo. The jury found 
defendant negligent, but also found in response to Special Issue 
No. 14, that plaintiff was driving at an excessive rate of speed and, 
in response to Special Issue No. 15, found that defendant's excessive 
rate of speed was a proximate cause of the accident. 142 Complicating 
the matter was the submission of a third issue regarding a Cadillac 
that did not collide with either of the other vehicles but played a 
pivotal role. "Assured clear distance" was defined by the trial court 
as: 
that distance which would be maintained by a driver using 
ordinary care when following another vehicle, considering the 
speed of such vehicles and the traffic on and condition of the 
street, so that the following vehicle can be safely brought to a 
stop without colliding with the preceding vehicle, or veering into 
other vehicles, objects or persons on or near the street. 143 
The jury was then asked, in Special Issue No. 18, "Do you find 
. . . that . . . [plaintiff] failed to maintain an assured clear distance 
between his vehicle and the white Cadillac vehicle. "144 The jury 
responded "we do not." 145 
141. 488 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 
142. [d. at 529. 
143. [d. at 530-3l. 
144. [d. at 530. 
145. [d. 
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The trial court entered a take nothing verdict against all par-
ties,146 and plaintiff appealed contending that the answers to Special 
Issues No. 14 and 15 should have been disregarded because they 
were in conflict with the finding in response to Special Issue No. 
18. The court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment _of the trial 
court, but the basis of the affirmance is somewhat unclear. The 
court did demonstrate that the conflict argued by the plaintiff did 
not in fact exist,147 and so the court might be seen as having 
concentrated on the first prong of the test for the effect of contra-
dictory findings on judgments. However, the court went on to 
conclude that "the answers in question are not in irreconcilable 
conflict." 148 With that language, the court appeared to be using 
"irreconcilable" or "fatal conflict" to express a conclusion with 
regard to the effect of the conflict on the judgment. Thus, the 
court might, having already held that the first prong of the test 
had been met, also be holding that the alleged conflict also fails to 
meet the second, or relevance prong. However, if the first prong is 
not met, and there is no conflict, there is no reason to proceed to 
test the relevance of that nonexistent conflict in the second prong. 
A logical analysis of the situation and of the court's reasoning 
should serve to clarify the court's position. 
If p stands for the proposition "Plaintiff drove at an excessive 
rate of speed" and q for the proposition "Driving at an excessive 
rate of speed was a proximate cause of the accident", then the 
responses to Special Issues No. 14 and 15 are Fp and Fq, respec-
tively. If r stands for the proposition "Plaintiff failed to maintain 
an assured clear distance", the response to Special Issue No. 18 
was -Fr. The court's first response to the claim that these findings 
are in conflict was to note that the negative response to Special 
Issue No. 18 "is not ... a finding that [plaintiff] maintained an 
'assured clear distance' between the pickup and the Cadillac. Rather, 
the negative answer to this issue simply means, in law, that the 
defendants failed to carry their burden of proving the fact inquired 
about. "149 
146. Id. The freight line for which defendant Castillo worked was also a defendant in the 
suit filed by Rhoades and had filed a cross-claim for damage to its tractor. A take-nothing 
judgment was entered on this cross-claim. Id. 
147. Id. at 531. See also infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text (describing the 
application of logic to the case). 
148. 488 S.W.2d at 531. 
149. Id. 
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The court has identified an important characteristic of the logic. 
The court's statement is simply that - Fr does not imply F( - r). If 
insufficient evidence has been offered to establish that the proba-
bility of -pis greater than the probability of p, or vice versa, or 
if the evidence is evenly divided, the two propositions are taken as 
legally equiprobable. 150 Neither is probable, and neither may be 
taken as found. Hence, there is the possibility that neither Fp nor 
F( - p) is found, so the fact that r has not been found does not 
imply that - r must have been found. 151 
While the court is correct in what it says, its first response is 
not adequate and the second response is needed to show that there 
is no conflict. The difficulty is that the court appears to conclude 
that there could be no conflict between - Fr, on the one hand, and 
Fp and Fq on the other. However, if Fp and Fq may be shown to 
imply Fr, there would be a contradiction. Similarly, if Fp and Fq 
can be shown to imply Fs, while - Fr implied - Fs or F( -s), there 
would also be a contradiction. The remainder of the court's dis-
cussion should then be taken, not as stating that even had there 
been a contradiction it would not have been relevant, but rather as 
ISO. Where proof is by clear and convincing evidence, or as in a criminal case, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the middle ground in which neither p nor - p may be taken as found is 
expanded. The two propositions need not be equiprobable .. If one merely has a probability 
somewhat in excess of one-half, the proposition may not be taken as found, and clearly its 
negation, the probability of which would be somewhat less than one-half, also could not be 
taken as found. 
lSI. Showing that a proposition, in this case - Fr-F( - r), does not hold in the logic is 
not subject to proof within the logic, except where it can be shown that the proposition's 
negation is a thesis. The demonstration that a proposition does not hold in a logic may be 
accomplished by showing that the proposition may be false in a model of the logic. The model 
for the logic presented here may be found in Saunders, supra note 56, at 104-05 nn.24-26, 
108-10 n.33. Within that model, the following diagram shows a world having access to itself 
and three other alternative states of affairs. Since p is true in two of the states of affairs or 
worlds and -pis also true in two worlds, Fp and F( - p) are both false. Since - Fp is true 
in a world, while F( - p) is false, - Fp does not imply F( - p). 
/ I ' 
~-------GJ 
~------0 
-------0 
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an examination of the content of p, q, and r to be sure that there 
is no implied or derivable contradiction. Before showing how the 
court's language should be read as making such an effort, it would 
be useful to use the logic to show that. there is, in fact, no implied 
contradiction and that the court was correct in its conclusion despite 
the lack of clarity in the direction of its analysis. 
To examine the possibility of any derived contradiction, the 
propositions that were found, and that which was not, must be 
examined for implications. Fp was a finding that plaintiff was· 
traveling at an excessive rate of speed. An "excessive rate of speed" 
would appear to require not just traveling at or in excess of some 
particular speed but also that the rate be one at which the reasonable 
person would not travel, so that travelling at that rate is negligence. 
Hence, p is necessarily equivalent to s&t, where t expresses some 
conjunction of facts regarding the rate of speed and s concludes that 
the rate expressed in t was negligent. Since p is necessarily equivalent l52 
to s&t, s&t may be substituted for p, and the response to Special 
Issue No. 14 becomes F(s&t) which by MLl3 and PC1 yields Fs. 
Turning to Special Issue No. 18, the jury did not find that 
plaintiff failed to maintain an assured clear distance. Under the 
court's explanation of "assured clear distance", such a failure to 
maintain would be based on certajn conditions of closeness, expressed 
as u, which may be a conjunction, and lack of ordinary care, 
expressed as v. Since r is necessarily equivalent l53 to u&v, the response 
to Special Issue No. 18 may be expressed as -F(u&v). 
It now becomes clear what more would be required for there to 
be a contradiction between the findings in Special Issues No. 14 and 
18. First, from -F(u&v), -Fv or F(-v) would have to be derivable. 
Second, -Fv or F(-v), would have to conflict with Fs. The court's 
discussion of the case may be taken as following the second route. 
The court states: 
The jury may have determined that inasmuch as [plaintiff] 
did not collide with the Cadillac the preponderance of evidence 
does not show that he was less than an assured clear distance 
from it. 
In light of the record, the jury's answer to issue 18 must be 
considered generous to [plaintiff]; but it does not inhibit or conflict 
with determinations by the jury, permissible under the record, 
152. The necessity of the equivalence is the conceptual necessity present in the explanation 
of how terms are used in a legal context. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
153. See supra note 152. 
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that his speed was too fast to enable him to maintain control of 
his vehicle when and after he attempted to turn and slow it, and 
that the speed was therefore imprudent and a contributing cause 
of the collision. 154 
The explanation is that the negligence expressed in s and that 
expressed in v are not the same in that they regard different acts or 
conditions. The finding that plaintiff was traveling at a negligently 
high rate of speed may have been based on conditions other than 
the proximity of an automobile in front of plaintiff, so a failure to 
find v or a finding of - v would not necessarily conflict with a 
finding of S.155 Furthermore, neither - Fv nor F( - v} is derivable 
from - F(U&V}.156 Under either approach, the court was correct in 
154. 488 S.W.2d at 531. 
155. The finding expressed as Fs might be viewed as a finding that plaintiff's rate of speed 
was excessive for some reason. That is, plaintiff was negligent in driving at some rate because 
of road conditions, proximity of other vehicles, condition of plaintiff's automobile, time of 
day or night, weather, or any of a number of other reasons. The finding -Fv or F(-v), if 
it could have been derived, see infra note 156 and accompanying text, would only have 
eliminated one of the bases for finding Fs and would not have been in conflict with Fs. The 
analysis would have been similar to that presented in Traywick v. Goodrich, 364 S.W.2d 190 
(Tex. 1963). For a discussion of Traywick see supra notes 126-40 and accompanying text. 
156. A counter example, constructed within the model, see Saunders, supra note 56, at 
122 app. 2, demonstrates the non-derivability. 
[-~----
------
In this case, a one world model suffices. Since u is false, (u&v) is false. Hence, (u&v) is not 
found in this single possible state of affairs; that is, -F(u&v) is true. However, since v is 
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concluding that there was no conflict, and the entire discussion must 
be taken as attempting to show that ther~ was no contradiction rather 
than as an examination of the relevance of an existing contradiction. 
A case in which the Texas Supreme Court's analysis clearly 
turned on the issue of relevance of a contradiction was presented by 
Texas & Pacific R.R. Co. v. Snider.157 In Snider, suit was brought 
against the railroad for wrongful death of plaintiff's husband in a 
crossing accident. Judgment in the trial court was for the railroad, 
but the Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment and 
remanded for retrial in part on the basis of an irreconcilable conflict 
in jury findings. 15s In reversing the court of civil appeals and affirming 
the judgment of the trial court, the Texas Supreme Court examined 
the alleged conflict, found that there was indeed a contradiction, but 
held that the conflict was not irreconcilable. 159 
The responses, expressed as findings, to thirteen of the special 
issues submitted are set out below. The numeral preceding the finding 
keys the finding to the special issue submission. 
17: Fp p: The train was plainly visible. 
18: F( - q) q: The train was in hazardous proximity when 
plaintiff was fifteen feet away. 
23: Fr r: The train was within 1500 feet when plaintiff was 
more than fifteen feet but less than fifty feet away. 
24: Fs s: The train was emitting a signal. 
25: Ft t: The train was in hazardous proximity before plaintiff 
was fifteen feet away. 
26: Fu u: Plaintiff stopped more than fifteen but less than 
fifty feet away from the crossing. 
27: Fv v: After stopping, plaintiff proceeded, when it was 
not safe to do so. 
28: Fw w: Proceeding when it was not safe was a proximate 
cause of the accident. 
38: Fx x: Plaintiff saw the train before driving onto the 
track. 
39: Fy y: Driving onto the track after seeing the train was 
contributory negligence. 
true, and - v is thus false, Fv and - F( - v) are both true, so neither - Fv nor F( - v) is 
deriveable from - F(u&v) in the logic. 
157. 159 Tex. 380, 321 S.W.2d 280 (1959). 
158. 315 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1958), rev'd, 159 Tex. 380, 321 S.W.2d 
280 (1959). 
159. 159 Tex. at 383-84, 321 S.W.2d at 282-83. 
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43: Fz z: Plaintiff heard the train before driving onto the 
track. 
44: Fa a: Driving onto the track after hearing the train was 
contributory negligence. 
47: Fb b: Failure to stop and wait for the train before driving 
onto the track was contributory negligence. 
The court recognized that there was a conflict between the 
answers to Special Issues No. 18 and 25. 160 The response to Special 
Issue No. 18 was that the train was not in hazardous proximity at 
the time plaintiff was fifteen feet from the crossing, while the answer 
to Special Issue No. 25 was that the train had been in hazardous 
proximity before the plaintiff was fifteen feet from the crossing. 161 
While there is no direct conflict between F( -q) and Ft, an exami-
nation of the relation between t and q reveals, a conflict. Unless 
either plaintiff's automobile or defendant's train was moving away 
from the crossing at the time in question, a suggestion belied by the 
fact that they collided at the crossing, the fact that they were 
hazardously close when plaintiff was more than fifteen feet from the 
crossing, gives rise to the assumption that they were at least as close 
at the point when plaintiff was fifteen feet from the crossing. The 
court must be willing to conclude that t necessarily implies q .162 If 
so, from L(t-q) and Ft, Fq may be derived through MLI5. Hence, 
a contradiction with F( - q) from Special Issue No. 18 is derived. 
Since there is a conflict, the materiality of the conflict must be 
considered. It must be deterniined whether the conflicting findings 
would lead to different judgments, when taken in conjunction with 
the other non-conflicting findings. 163 That is, it must be determined 
whether: 
and 
(l) Fp & Fr & Fs & Ft & Fu & Fv & Fw & Fx & Fy & Fz 
& Fa & Fb 
160. Id. at 382, 321 S.W.2d at 282. 
161. Id. at 382-83, 321 S.W.2d at 282. 
162. The necessity involved here would appear to be a combination of conceptual and 
theoretical. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. First, conceptual necessity provides . 
the explanation that "hazardous proximity" means "too close given the circumstances of 
events". Second, physical or scientific theory provides the theoretical necessity that objects 
that are already too close and are getting closer remain too close, assuming of course, that 
there is not a change in the conditions or events that made the objects too close in the first 
place. 
163. See supra text accompanying note 97. 
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(2) Fp & F( - q) & Fr & Fs & Fu & Fv & Fw & Fx & Fy & 
Fz & Fa & Fb 
lead to different judgments. 
75 
The court addressed this question by noting that the findings in 
response to Special Issues No. 18 and 25 were only relevant to a 
statutory duty to stop between fifteen and fifty feet from a crossing 
and not proceed until it was safe to do SO.I64 The court noted that 
whether the train was or was not in hazardous proximity, plaintiff 
did stop within the required distance, as the jury found in response 
to Special Issue No. 26. Thus, whether plaintiff stopped in order to 
comply with the statute, or for any other reason, he did in fact 
comply with the statute by stopping within the required distance. 
The court also noted that having stopped, there was a common law 
duty of ordinary care not to proceed until it was safe to do SO.165 
Fv established that plaintiff had violated that common law duty, and 
Fw established that the violation was a proximate cause of the 
accident. 
The conjunction Fu&Fv&Fw is then adequate to establish con-
tributory negligence. Since Fu&Fv&Fw may be derived from either 
(l) or (2), through PC 1, contributory negligence is established without 
regard to the conflict between the responses to Special Issues No. 18 
and 25. This is true because, in either case, accepting either (1) or 
(2), plaintiff's contributory negligence leads to a judgment for the 
defendant, and thus, the conflict is not material. 
Little Rock Furniture Manufacturing Co. v. Dunn l66 presents an 
interesting case in which the court noted a conflict between findings 
in response to special issues and in which a logical look demonstrates 
164. 159 Tex. at 383, 321 S.W.2d at 282. The statute provided: 
Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade crossing, the 
driver of such vehicle shall stop within fifty (50) feet but not less than fifteen (15) 
feet from the nearest rail of such railroad and shall not proceed until he can do so 
safely when: 
(c) A railroad engine approaching within approximately fifteen hundred (1500) 
feet of the highway crossing emits a signal audible from such distance and such 
engine by reason of its speed or nearness to such crossing is an immediate hazard; 
(d) An approaching train is plainly visible and is in hazardous proximity to such 
crossing. 
TEX. REv. Cry. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, § 86 (Vernon 1977). 
165. 159 Tex. at 383, 321 S.W.2d at 282. 
166. 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985 (1949). 
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that one of the findings is in itself logically unacceptable. In Little 
Rock, plaintiff's automobile ran into defendant's truck from behind 
while the truck was stopped partially on the paved portion of the 
highway. Defendant contended that plaintiff Dunn had been contri-
butorily negligent, and in response to special issues submitted on that 
question conflicting answers were returned. 
Special Issue No. 15 asked: "Do you find ... that ... [plaintiff] 
failed to keep a proper lookout for his own safety?"!67 The jury 
answered in the affirmative. Special Issue No. 16 asked: "Do you 
find ... that [plaintiff's] failure to keep a proper lookout, if you 
have so found, was negligence, as that term has been defined to you 
herein?"!68 In response, the jury answered "no." In the instructions 
and the charge, the court defined "proper lookout" as "such a 
lookout as an ordinarily prudent person would have kept under the 
same or similar circumstances."!69 
In examining the response to Special Issue No. 15, the court 
noted that "[i]t is apparent that, considering the definition th.e court 
gave of 'proper lookout,' the effect of the jury's answer to Special 
Issue No. 15 was that [plaintiff] was negligent."!70 While the jury 
did not state that plaintiff was contributorily negligent in response 
to Special Issue No. 15, the court seemed willing to conclude that 
such a finding follows legally and logically from the jury's finding. 
Symbolizing the relations between the propositions may help make 
clear the conclusion. 
If p stands for "Plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout", then 
p is necessarily equivalent!7! to q&r, where r is a conjunction describ-
ing the lookout, or lack thereof, that was kept, and q states that the 
lookout in r was negligent. Since p and q&r are necessarily equivalent, 
the response to Special Issue No. 15, Fp, may be replaced by F(q&r). 
Then, through ML13 and PC1, Fq may be derived. The court found 
a conflict between Fq and the response to Special Issue No. 16, 
which it characterized as also being a finding on negligence. Since 
the negligence in Special Issue No. 16 would also be with regard to 
167. [d. at 200, 222 S.W.2d at 987. 
168. [d., 222 S.W.2d at 988. 
169. Id. at 201, 222 S.W.2d at 988. 
170. Id. at 202, 222 S. W .2d at 988. 
171. The necessity would be the conceptual necessity involved in the relationship between 
legal terms. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
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the lookout inquired into in Special Issue No. 15, the finding would 
be - Fq, 172 and there would be a contradiction. 
The court resolved the conflict question on materiality grounds. 
Despite the conflict, the findings do not lead to differing judgments. 
The failure to find contributory negligence in response to Special 
Issue No. 16 would lead to judgment for the plaintiff. The finding 
of contributory negligence included in the response to Special Issue 
No. 15 would not, however, lead to judgment for the defendant. 
The difficulty for defendant is found in the fact that Special Issue 
No. 17, regarding proximate cause, was submitted conditionally, only 
to be answered if Special Issue No. 16 was answered in the affirm-
ative, and thus, was not answered. Since there was no finding of 
proximate cause, the findings do not lead to different judgments. 
The conflict was not material, and the judgment could stand. 173 
Looked at from a logical point of view, the case presents an 
additional problem. Special Issue No. 16 asks the jury, in effect, 
"Do you find that failure to keep a proper lookout is negligence?" 
This, in itself presents a problem, since the jury is asked not to make 
a factual finding but rather to come to a conclusion of law, and 
when the meaning of "proper lookout" is inserted, the logical 
problem becomes clear. "Proper lookout" was defined so as to 
include negligence, q&r in the symbols that were employed. In asking 
the jury whether it finds that failure to keep a proper lookout was 
negligent, the jury was in effect being asked to determine whether 
F((q&r)-q) is true or false. That question presents one problem, 
and the answer presents another. 
The problem with the question is that it asks not a question of 
fact but rather one of logic. The logical question is tied to the legal 
question of whether failure to keep a proper lookout is negligence, 
because the conceptual necessity that leads to the answer to the 
logical question is based on the legal definition of "proper lookout". 
Special issues are questions concerning facts, and this pure question 
of law should not have been submitted. 174 A similar conclusion would 
172. The question was "Do you find ... ?" and the answer was "No." 148 Tex. at 200-
01, 222 S.W.2d at 987-88. The symbolization would be -Fq. If the question had been "Was 
... ?" and the answer "No," the symbolization might then have been F(-q). 
173. 148 Tex. at 206, 222 S.W.2d at 991. 
174. The questions may be broad or narrow and more or less global. See Spradley, supra 
note 6. However, "[iln the special issue charge, the judge formulates a series of specific fact 
issues ... " Note, The Scope of Special Issues, supra note 3, at 736 (emphasis added). An 
issue involving no facts should not be submitted. 
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appear mandated with regard to the submission of a question of 
logic. 
The problem with the answer, from a logical point of view, is 
that it is wrong. Having concluded that it is conceptually necessary 
that failure to keep a proper lookout is negligence, the jury must 
find that failure to keep a proper lookout is negligence. That is, 
since L((q&r)-q) , by MLll, F((q&r)-q) must be true. The jury 
cannot, within the bounds of logic, fail to find (q&r)-q. 
The response to Special Issue No. 16 should be ignored, not 
because of any inadequacy of evidence to support it, although clearly 
no evidence could support such a finding, but on the grounds of the 
logical impossibility of the finding. There would then be no conflict. 
The response to Special Issue No. 15 should stand, although without 
any answer to Special Issue No. 17, the judgment would not be 
affected. 
V. DEALING WITH MULTIPLE CONFLICTS 
Bradford v. Arhelgerl75 raises the question of how courts should 
cope with more than two conflicting responses to special issues. 
Bradford is not the first case in which such a situation presented 
itself, since A.B.C. Stores, Inc. v. Taylor l76 presented the same 
combination of findings. However, Bradford provided an extensive 
discussion of the problem that had been lacking from the A.B.C. 
Stores opinion. 
In Bradford, the jury found that the defendant had been neg-
ligent in the operation of a motor vehicle and that such negligence 
was a proximate cause of the collision at issue. The jury also found 
that the plaintiff had been negligent in operating his automobile and 
that plaintiff's negligence had been a proximate cause of the collision. 
Finally, the jury found that the collision was an unavoidable accident. 
Plaintiff moved for mistrial on the basis of irreconcilable conflict in 
the findings, but the trial court denied plaintiff's motion and entered 
judgment for the defendant. The trial court's judgment was affirmed 
by the court of civil appeals. 
Letting q represent defendant's negligence and proximate cause, 
175. 161 Tex. 427, 340 S.W.2d 772 (1960). 
176. 136 Tex. 89, 148 S.W.2d 392 (1941). For a discussion of the court's analysis in A.B.C. 
Stores, see supra notes 112-25 and accompanying text. 
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the first finding is symbolized as Fq. Letting p represent plaintiff's 
negligence and proximate cause, the second finding is symbolized as 
Fp. The third finding, that the collision was an unavoidable accident, 
must include findings that neither plaintiff nor defendant was neg-
ligent. That finding may be symbolized as F(-p&-q). Since by 
ML13, F(-p& -q) implies F( -p)&F( -q), and by PC1, F( -p)&F( -q) 
yields F( - p) and F( - q), there is clearly a contradiction (or there 
are contradictions) between (or among) the finding of unavoidable 
accident and the findings regarding negligence. 
The court treated the case as presenting two conflicts, one 
between unavoidable accident and defendant's negligence and the 
other between unavoidable accident and plaintiff's negligence. The 
court then applied the materiality test to each of the conflicts. Since 
the first conflict was seen as between F( - p& - q) and Fq, the court 
first disregarded F( - p& - q) and considered Fq with all the rest of 
the verdict. Since the verdict included Fp, the findings included 
contributory negligence, and the judgment would have to be for 
defendant. The court then disregarded Fq and considered F( - p& - q) 
along with the rest of the verdict, a verdict which included Fp. The 
court concluded that since the rest of the verdict included no finding 
that the defendant was negligent, judgment would have still be found 
for defendant. 177 
The court then considered the second conflict, that between 
F( - p& - q) and Fp. It first disregarded F( - p& - q) and considered 
Fp along with the rest of the verdict. Since Fp established plaintiff's 
contributory negligence, judgment would have to be for defendant. 
The court then disregarded Fp, and considered F( - p& - q) along 
with the rest of the verdict, including Fq. The court noted that these 
two findings were themselves in fatal conflict and would not support 
, a judgment for either party.178 
The court was then left with a situation in which application of 
the materiality test resulted in four combinations, three of which 
177. Perhaps a better approach, with the same result, would have been to recognize that 
there would still be a. conflict between F( - p& - q) and Fp, since F( - p) is derivable from 
F( - p& - q), and to apply the materiality test. Disregarding F( - p& - q) and accepting Fp, 
judgment would be for defendant on a contributory negligence basis. Disregarding Fp and 
accepting F( - p& - q), judgment would also be for defendant on the basis of unavoidable 
accident. Since the judgment would be the same under either branch, the conflict could be 
disregarded, and the conclusion of each branch, judgment for defendant, could be taken as 
the result in the main branch under consideration. 
178. For an alternative approach and conclusion, see infra text accompanying note 181. 
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would require judgment for the defendant with the fourth leading to 
no judgment. Despite the fact that the materiality test looks toward 
judgment in favor of one party in one case and ·the opposite party 
in the other, the court concluded that the test itself is met when its 
application leads to a situation in which judgment may not be entered 
for either party. On that basis the court reversed and remanded. 
The dissent took a different view as to the nature of the conflict. 
While stating the three findings in conflict in its description of the 
case, the dissent treated the case as involving a single conflict, stating: 
"While we are concerned with three separate findings, actually the 
conflict consisted in the findings that both parties were negligent and 
that neither party was negligent. "179 
Given this view of the conflict, the dissent simply applied the 
materiality test. Disregarding F( - p& - q) and accepting the rest of 
the verdict, including what it seemed to treat as F(p&q) , judgment 
would be for the defendant on a contributory negligence basis. 
Disregarding F(p&q) and accepting the rest of the verdict, including 
F( - p& - q), judgment would be for the defendant, since the accident 
was unavoidable. Since judgment would be in favor of the defendant 
in either case, the findings were not in fatal conflict, and the judgment 
for the defendant could be affirmed. 
There are difficulties presented by both the majority· and the 
dissenting approach, but the more serious difficulty is presented by 
the dissent. The dissent, in treating the conflict as being between two 
findings, assumes the equivalence of the set of findings Fp, Fq, 
F( - p& - q) and the set of findings F(p&q) , F( - p& - q). That as-
sumption rests on the equivalence of Fp and Fq to F(p&q). But, the 
unacceptability of deriving F(p&q) from Fp and Fq was what led to 
the rejection of propositional logic as inadequate for the analysis of 
findings in the first place. ISO Hence, it is only through an error of 
logic that the dissent is able to conclude that each of the, in its view 
two, conflicting findings led to judgment for the defendant and that, 
therefore, the conflict was not material. 
The difficulty with the majority approach, as stated, is simply 
that it did not go far enough. The majority concluded that in three 
cases, judgment was for the defendant and in one case there could 
be no judgment. lSI This should probably be taken as a recognition 
179. 161 Tex. at 431,340 S.W.2d at 775 (Culver, J., dissenting). 
180. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. 
181. 161 Tex. at 429, 340 S.W.2d at 774. 
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that in the fourth case, disregarding Fp and taking Fq and F( - p& - q), 
there was still a conflict. If, however, both branches of that conflict 
had led to judgments for the defendant, there would be no reason 
why judgment for the defendant could not stand. 
The materiality test should have been applied a second time to 
the conflict between Fq and F( - p& - q), remembering of course that 
Fp had already been disregarded. Disregarding Fq and accepting 
F( - p& - q), judgment would be for the defendant on the basis of 
unavoidable accident. However, disregarding F( - p& - q) and ac-
cepting Fq, judgment would be for plaintiff, since Fp had already 
been disregarded. Hence, the materiality test did not need to be 
changed to include a situation in which one branch led to no 
judgment. The court merely needed to recognize that in some situ-
ations a second application of the test, and a second branching, 
might be required. The test would then be that if any two branchings 
led to judgments for the opposing parties, the judgment could not 
stand. 
It should be clear from the differing conclusions reached by the 
majority and the. dissent that how the findings are grouped can 
profoundly affect the result. The dissent, by inappropriately combin-
ing two of the findings, created a single conflict between two findings 
and concluded that the conflict was not fatal. The majority, while 
committing no logical error did not carry the test as far as it might 
have. Although the majority rendered the correct conclusion, it might 
have based the conclusion on the fact that one of the second level 
branches led to a judgment for plaintiff, while all the other branches 
led to judgment for the defendant, instead of relying on the theory 
that one branch reached no result. 
There is another approach that would ensure that all possible 
combinations of the conflicting findings are considered. 182 The first 
step is to take any finding of a conjunction and, through ML13, 
break it down to findings of each conjunct. IS3 Thus, the findings in 
Bradford would be taken as Fq, F(-p) and F(-q). The findings are 
182. For another attempt at listing combinations of conflicting findings, see Note, Proce-
dure-Special Issues-Conflicting Answers, 15 Sw. L.l. 460 (1961). 
183. Some information is, of course, lost in deriving Fp and Fq from F(p&q). F(p&q) 
indicates that p and q occur together in the required proportion of alternative states of affairs, 
while Fp and Fq indicate merely that each occurs in the required proportion of alternative 
states of affairs. In determining the materiality of conflicts, however, that should make no 
difference. The conjunction leads to a conflict, even ifit is not equivalent to the conflict, and 
that should be enough to make the conflict material. 
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then paired with their conflicting findings, Fp with F( - p)184 and Fq 
with F( -q). All the combinations taking one of each pair are then 
listed, and the judgment for each combination is determined: 
Fp and Fq: defendant 
Fp and F( - q): defendant 
F( - p) and Fq: plaintiff 
F( - p) and F( - q): defendant 
If the judgments differ at all, the conflict is fatal. 
While the method suggested leads to the majority conclusion, 
and while the additional branching suggested to improve the majority 
analysis would be similar in effect to this combinatorial approach, 
the value of the approach would be found in more complex examples. 
Suppose findings of Fp, F(q&-r), F(-p&-q), and F(r&-p). The 
combinations of findings for application of the traditional materiality 
test might be difficult to handle. However, breaking the conjunctions 
down and pairing the conflicting findings l85 would result in Fp and 
F(-p), Fq and F(-q), and Fr and F(-r). It is then relatively simple 
to list the eight combinations that result from taking one of each 
pair, and the judgment could be examined for each combination. 
If one of the findings involves a disjunction, it is important to 
recognize that it may not be broken down into its disjuncts. That is, 
from F(pVq), F(-p) and F(-q), the pairs Fp, F(-p) and Fq, F(-q) 
may not be derived. 186 But even where there is a disjunction buried 
within a conjunction, breaking down the conjunction and pairing 
any conflicting conjuncts will simplify the problem, even though one 
of the paired conjuncts will be a disjunction. 187 
184. Fp might in another example end up paired with - Fp. 
185. If one of the conjuncts does not have a conflicting finding, it is not considered in 
determining the combinations involved. However, it is still considered along with all the rest 
of the verdict in determining the judgment arrived at for each combination. 
186. There are, in fact, no conflicting findings here, since all three may be true at the 
same time. See supra notes 27-33 and accompaftying text. 
187. The negative of the conjunction Fp VFq would be - (Fp VFq) which might also be 
written as -Fp&-Fq. If written in the latter form, it would have been broken down to -Fp 
and - Fq, and it would be difficult to see the pairing with Fp VFq. If - Fp and - Fq are 
both already paired with Fp and Fq, FpVFq may be disregarded, since stronger findings of 
Fp and Fq are already considered in the analysis. If - Fp and - Fq are not both already 
paired and originally were present as a conjunction, they should be recombined and paired 
with FpVFq. 
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In breaking complex findings down to more simple components 
for combination in cases of multiple conflicting findings, the logic 
will be of value. For example, it is not immediately clear that a 
failure to find a disjunction of two purported facts might be broken 
up into the failure to find each disjunct. Yet, since by MLl6, Fp 
implies F(p V q), by contraposition, - F(p V q) implies - Fp. Similarly, 
- Fq could be derived. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has presented a formal logic that may be employed 
in the analysis of special issue conflicts. While practitioners are 
perhaps unlikely to employ the formal analysis presented with any 
great regularity, the analytic tools are now in place to be used when 
complexity makes informal analysis unacceptably cumbersome. Per-
haps more importantly, reading the formal analysis both necessitates 
and provides a vehicle for developing a better informal understanding 
of the nature of special issue conflicts. This increased informal 
understanding and some of the specific suggestions offered in the 
formal analysis should lead to an improved jurisprudence of special 
issue conflicts. 
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